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Laura Alexander & Steven C. Salop`
Abstract
Anticompetitive conduct toward upstream trading partners may have the
effect of benefiting downstream consumers even as the conduct harms the
firms’ workers or suppliers. Defendants may attempt to justify their
upstream conduct—and may rely on the ancillary restraints doctrine in
doing so—on the grounds that the restraints create efficiencies benefitting
` purchasers, rather than focusing solely on the impact of the restraint on
the workers or suppliers in the upstream market. Such balancing of harms
against out-of-market benefits achieved by a different group should be
rejected by antitrust doctrine generally, and specifically in the case of
harms to workers. This type of out-of-market balancing is not supported
by either economic analysis or the basic goals of the antitrust laws.
Antitrust’s consumer welfare prescription properly protects the trading
partner participants (e.g., workers) in any relevant market who are
harmed by anticompetitive restraints. Doctrinal and practical
considerations weigh against allowing that protection to be traded against
out-of-market benefits flowing to other groups. This proposition flows
both ways; putting aside antitrust exemptions, it is similarly inconsistent
with antitrust doctrine to permit firms to coordinate in ways that harm
downstream purchasers, based on a purported justification that this
purchaser harm is offset by the out-of-market benefits to the workers. We
conclude that in all cases, multi-market balancing that treats out-marketbenefits as cognizable justifications for the restraints on workers or other
input suppliers should be rejected. However, since courts sometimes may
not agree in limited circumstances such as two-sided platforms, we also
briefly discuss how and in what circumstances such balancing might be
undertaken. We apply this analysis to a series of real and hypothetical
scenarios that raise paradigmatic issues involving these potential
conflicting effects as they relate to workers. We also apply our analysis to
a likely post-Alston case attacking the NCAA restraints on non-education
payments to student-athletes, in light of the points made in Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Alston.
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I.

Introduction

Antitrust law has never been a major player in supporting worker welfare. 1 Antitrust enforcement
has tended to focus on anticompetitive conduct directed against downstream purchasers, not
workers. In the first decades after passage of the Sherman Act, antitrust law was used as a sword
against trade unions. Unions were eventually exempted from the antitrust laws by Section 6 of
the Clayton Act in 1914.2 In 1948, the Supreme Court made clear that a buyer cartel directed at
farmers was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 3 As late as 1996, it was necessary for the
Supreme Court to explain that “a market wide agreement among employers setting wages at
levels that would not prevail in a free market may violate the Sherman Act.” 4 In recent years,
courts have vacillated on whether wage fixing and (vertical or horizontal) no-poach agreements

* Vice President of Policy, American Antitrust Institute (Alexander); Professor (Emeritus) of Economics
& Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Senior Consultant, Charles River Associates (Salop).
The views expressed in this article are our own and may not reflect the views of our colleagues,
consulting clients, AAI, or its advisors or sponsors. We are grateful for helpful comments from Dennis
Carlton, Daniel Francis, Scott Hemphill, Jon Jacobson, Tom Krattenmaker, Mark Lemley, Doug
Melamed, Eric Posner, and Randy Stutz, and research assistance of Tessa Griego. All errors are our own.
1

Douglas L. Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1980); Suresh Naidu, Eric A.
Posner, Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536 (2018);
Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 65, 76-78
(2019); Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke, The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard
for Antitrust, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 595 (2019); Hiba Hafiz, Labor's Antitrust Paradox, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
381 (2020); Eric A. Posner, HOW ANTITRUST FAILED WORKERS (2021).
2

15 U.S.C. § 17.

3

Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).

4

Brown v Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 252 (1996) (citing Anderson v. Shipowners Ass’n of Pac.
Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926)).

3

constitute per se violations, and DOJ and private plaintiffs have lost a series of cases attacking
worker restraints.5
Several factors might explain this neglect by antitrust of concerns about worker harms. First, a
central focus of labor economics is unionization and unions are seen as cartels, albeit legal ones. 6
Second, it was commonly assumed that the buyer side of labor markets was competitive. Third,
and our focus here, the fact that higher wages can lead to higher downstream prices can create a
fundamental conflict between the interests of downstream purchasers and the interests of workers
(putting aside the fact that most consumers are also workers). Antitrust’s “consumer welfare
standard” and the ancillary restraints doctrine sometimes have been taken to imply that only the
effects on downstream purchasers matter, or that benefits to downstream purchasers should take
precedence over any harms to workers or other upstream trading partners.
Concerns about anticompetitive conduct directed at workers have been increasing. One reason is
the recognition of the decline in the relative position of middle- and lower-income workers.
Compensation of median workers trailed economywide (net) productivity growth by roughly
43% between 1979 and 2017.7 “During this time, 90% of U.S. workers experienced wage growth
slower than the economywide average.” 8 Labor’s share of GDP has declined significantly.9 At
the same time, the share of income captured by the 1% and 0.1% has risen dramatically. 10
Corporate profits have risen significantly from around 7.5 percent in 1985 to over 11 percent in
2016.11
There are numerous causes of this decline in workers’ relative well-being that are not driven by
antitrust issues. Weakening of labor law, the reduction in unionization and industry
deregulation have led to lower worker income shares. Free trade has increased competition from
5

U.S. v. DaVita Inc., case no. 1:21-cr-00229, [jury verdict] (D. Colo. Apr. 15, 2022); U.S. v. Jindal, case
no. 4:20-cr-00358, [jury verdict] (E.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2022); Turner v. McDonald’s USA LLC, case no.
1:19-cv-05524, [grant of motion for judgment on the pleadings] (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2022); Deslandes v.
McDonald’s USA LLC, case no. 1:17-cv-04857, [grant of motion for judgment on the pleadings] (N.D. Ill.
June 28, 2022).
6

Leslie, supra note 1.

7

Lawrence Mishel & Josh Bivens, Identifying the Policy Levers Generating Wage Suppression and Wage
Inequality, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 13, 2021), https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/wagesuppression-inequality/.
8

Id.

9

See, e.g., David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen.
Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (2017); David Autor, David
Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the
Rise of Superstar Firms, 135 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 645 (2020).
10

Mishel & Bivens, supra note 7.

11

Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 733 (2018).
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foreign firms with lower labor costs and weaker regulations. Various industries have become
more capital intensive and new capital-intensive industries have become more important,
reducing the demand for production workers. Of course, any weakening of antitrust that permits
increased downstream market power also reduces the “real wages” of workers.
The tides of worker welfare in antitrust appear to be shifting. In the past decade, there has seen
increased antitrust enforcement against restraints directed at workers. A notable matter was an
agreement to eliminate competition for engineers that was orchestrated by the CEOs of Apple
and Google and then other bilateral agreements that involved Adobe, Intuit, Intel, and Pixar. 12
Yet, even here, the DOJ has held back. The DOJ chose to bring this case as a civil, not criminal,
matter, perhaps because of the novelty of enforcement against this type of conduct.
It was only in 2016 that the DOJ announced that it would bring such horizontal no-poach
agreements criminally.13 Yet, as an illustration of the lack of attention previously given to per se
illegal restraints directed at workers, the defendant in United States v. Surgical Care Affiliates
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it would violate “fundamental principles of due process
and fair notice” to allow a criminal prosecution before it has been established in the civil context
that no-poach agreements are per se illegal. 14 They argued that neither the Sherman Act nor the
Government’s 2016 announcement were sufficient notice.15
A similar reticence has been shown by the treatment of no-poach agreements among franchisors
with their franchisees. In some of these cases, courts have evaluated these agreements as
ancillary restraints, applying the rule of reason on the grounds that they lead to lower prices to
downstream purchasers.16 Similarly, some commentary suggests that outside of naked price
fixing, the overarching consumer welfare standard should only condemn conduct that leads to

12

United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629, 2011 WL 10883994 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011); see
also United States v. Lucasfilms Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-02220, 2011 WL 2636850 (D.D.C. June 3, 2011).
13

“Naked wage-fixing or no-poaching agreements among employers, whether entered into directly or
through a third-party intermediary, are per se illegal under the antitrust laws…. Going forward, the DOJ
intends to proceed criminally against naked wage- fixing or no-poaching agreements.” U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
PROFESSIONALS 3 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download.
14

Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, United States v. Surgical Care
Affiliates, No. 3:21-cr-00011 (N.D. Tex. Jan 5, 2021).
15

Id. at 15-17.

16

See, e.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-c-4875, 2018 WL 3105955 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jun
25, 2018); Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F.Supp.3d 786, 797 (S.D. Ill. 2018); Ogden v
Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc., 393 F.Supp.3d 622, 632-35 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
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classical monopsony power, which is power that typically also harms downstream purchasers as
well as workers or suppliers. 17
In this article, we examine how workers’ interests can be protected within current antitrust law.
We explain how greater appreciation of the antitrust harms suffered by workers, combined with a
recognition that balancing of out-of-market benefits against in-market harms is generally
inappropriate, can better protect workers under existing law. In addition to adding consistency to
antitrust doctrine, such recognition of antitrust harms to workers is in sync with economic and
social policy goals of reducing income inequality. 18
We are not the first to recommend that antitrust pay more attention to worker harms from
anticompetitive conduct or that worker welfare be considered as important as the welfare of
downstream purchasers.19 We follow and extend the approach in the recent article by Hemphill
and Rose, which analyzes mergers that lead to lower wages from either classical monopsony or
increased bargaining leverage of the merging firms. 20 They argue that merger benefits to
downstream purchasers do not justify the harms to workers because these benefits are “out of
market” effects and disallowed under Philadelphia National Bank (PNB).21 In this article, we
develop and apply this approach to a variety of non-merger restraints. 22 Moreover, while
analysis of the case law focuses primarily on restraints that harm workers, our basic analysis can

17

See e.g., Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
297 (1991); Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing, Monopsony and Antitrust, 36
ANTITRUST BULLETIN 1 (1991); Debbie Feinstein & Albert Teng, Buyer Power: Is Monopsony the New
Monopoly?, 33 ANTITRUST 12 (2019).
18

For discussion of the complexity of these issues for the context of antitrust policy, see Jonathan B.
Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. 1, 24–26 (2015);
Daniel Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171 (2016).
19

See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from
Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2429 (2013); Randy M. Stutz, The Evolving Antitrust
Treatment of Labor-Market Restraints: From Theory to Practice (July 31, 2018); Marshall Steinbaum,
Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 45 (2019);
Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption, 82 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 65, 76-78
(2019); Ioana Marinescu & Eric A. Posner, Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers?, 105 CORNELL L.
REV. 1343 (2020); Eric A. Posner, HOW ANTITRUST FAILED WORKERS (2021).
20

C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 2078 (2018).

21

United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (hereinafter, PNB).

22

We also follow a similar approach to Randy M. Stutz, Comments of the American Antitrust Institute,
Public Workshop on Competition in Labor Markets (September 23, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1217841/download.
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be applied generally to the rule of reason, including to the role of the ancillary restraints doctrine
where harm to other input suppliers is at issue.
We specifically propose that workers (as trading partner participants in a market) harmed by an
anticompetitive restraint should be protected by the antitrust laws. We also propose that the PNB
approach to mergers also should apply to all buyer-side restraints analyzed under the Sherman
Act. Where a buyer-side competitive restraint in the labor market harms workers from a
reduction in competition (whether from classical monopsony or increased bargaining leverage
monopsony), the restraint violates the Sherman Act. No separate showing of harm to
downstream purchasers is required. Even if the restraint benefits downstream purchasers, those
benefits should not be considered a cognizable justification nor balanced against the competitive
harms suffered by the workers from the restraint. Neither the ancillary restraints doctrine nor
any other legal principle requires this result. We thus agree with the spirit of Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Alston, where he stated that “[College football] traditions alone
cannot justify the NCAA’s decision to build a massive money-raising enterprise on the backs of
student athletes who are not fairly compensated. “ 23
Because the Court may ultimately disagree with the PNB approach in certain multi-market
situations, we therefore also consider how a court might engage in a multi-market welfarebalancing exercise. If such balancing is to be permitted, we specifically propose that courts only
allow balancing in limited circumstances and place a relatively high burden of proof on the
defendant to establish those circumstances and prove that the balance clearly favors the restraint.
Some commentators have suggested that independent contractor workers should be permitted the
freedom to negotiate terms collectively with the firms that purchase their services. 24 Such
negotiations are treated today as per se illegal. We suggest that under existing law, the creation
of worker associations that negotiate collectively with client firms could pass muster under BMI
and similar cases if the associations lack market power and also provide integration benefits to
the market.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, we identify the three flavors
of monopsony conduct—classical monopsony that harms downstream purchasers, classical
monopsony that does not harm downstream purchasers, and monopsony bargaining leverage
(i.e., non-classical monopsony) that can benefit downstream purchasers—and their disparate
effects on downstream purchasers. In Section III, we explain why the consumer welfare
standard properly understood neither ignores harms suffered by workers nor privileges the
23

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S.Ct. 2141, 2169 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

24

See, e.g., Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small Players’
Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195 (2001); Marina Lao,
Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1543 (2018); Naidu, supra note 1.
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effects of conduct on downstream purchasers over upstream worker harms. We then present our
view that courts should follow the PNB doctrine beyond merger cases and reject claims that
benefits to downstream purchasers are cognizable procompetitive justifications for competitive
restraints that harm workers. We also explain when and how courts might balance effects, if
they disagree with our approach of extending the PNB doctrine. In Sections IV, we apply this
analysis to a variety of specific restraints that can harm workers. These include no-poach
agreements, exclusionary restraints, joint purchasing of labor and seller-side cartels. We also
analyze collective negotiation of wage rates by contract workers. In Section V, we apply our
approach to the likely post-Alston case attacking the NCAA’s restrictions on payments to
student-athletes that are not education-related, concluding that the restraints would not pass
muster under the rule of reason. Section VI concludes.
II.

Economic Analysis of Monopsony (Buyer-Side Market Power)

Buyer-side market power—or monopsony, broadly defined—has not been ignored by industrial
organization and antitrust scholars. 25 The basic economic model is classical monopsony, which
is the buyer-side analogue to monopoly, or market power more generally. 26 Classical
monopsony exercised against upstream trading partners typically reduces downstream output as
well as upstream prices and volume or, in the case of workers, wage rates and employment, so it
harms downstream purchasers as well as upstream workers or other input suppliers. However, in
certain scenarios, classical monopsony may harm workers or other upstream trading partners
without having any economic impact on total output or downstream purchasers. Finally, buyerside market power in the form of increased bargaining leverage harms workers and other
upstream suppliers but may not harm downstream purchasers. In fact, it may even increase
output and benefit downstream purchasers. Thus, there can be welfare conflict between
upstream trading partners, such as workers, and downstream purchasers. We explain these
economic concepts below in the context of worker harms, but the same analysis can be applied
more generally to the exercise of buyer-side power against all types of upstream trading partners.

25

See, e.g., Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 589 (2005); John
B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 1485 (2012); Blair
& Harrison, supra note 16. Buyer power also might be exercised to force the workers to raise the prices
that they charge rival sellers, rather than to reduce the costs of the monopsony buyer. U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 8 (2010) (hereinafter, Merger
Guidelines), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1197731/download.
26

The term “monopsony” is often taken to refer solely to what we are calling “classical” monopsony. In
this article, we will use the term “monopsony” to include all three variants discussed here. This
corresponds to usage on the sell-side, where an increase in bargaining leverage from a merger is treated as
an anticompetitive unilateral effect, that is, an effective increase in market power. Id. at § 6.2.
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A.

Classical Monopsony That Harms Downstream Purchasers

“Classical” monopsony over workers arises where the buyer faces a rising input supply curve of
atomistic workers and offers workers a uniform take-it-or-leave-it wage rate. The classical
monopsonist realizes that if it restricts employment, it will be able to pay less to the workers that
it hires, and it calculates its marginal cost of labor based on this assumption, setting the wage rate
at a lower level and restricting employment. If the monopsonist also has market power in the
downstream market, employment and output are further restricted. This is because firm also
takes into account the fact that it will be able to charge a higher price, if it restricts output. 27 This
also entails further reducing employment and the wage rate, as estimated by Yeh et al. 28 Thus,
the conduct causes competitive harm to workers and consumers and reduces economic
efficiency.
The exercise of classical monopsony power is limited to the situation where the supply of labor
is rising with the wage rate. If the labor supply curve is perfectly elastic (i.e., flat) at the
competitive wage rate, then the classical monopsony model does not apply. In the past, it was
sometimes assumed that this was the typical case, which may be a reason why monopsony has
often been ignored. However, it is clear the labor supply curve is almost never perfectly
elastic.29
B.

Classical Monopsony That Does Not Harm Downstream Purchasers

Classical monopsony may not harm downstream purchasers. First, classical monopsony power
does not lead to lower output when the supply of labor is perfectly inelastic in the region where
demand and supply are equal. Supply may be perfectly inelastic when there is literally a limited
number of qualified workers and hours. Alternatively, a number of workers may have invested
in certain qualifications that have now been sunk, so that their labor supply is essentially
inelastic. A buyer-side agreement here would lead solely to a reduction in the wage rate below
the competitive level, but would have no effect on employment, output or downstream prices
charged by the firms. For example, absent the players’ union, suppose the team owners agreed
to reduce the salaries of the top players by some percentage. In this case, a sole focus on
downstream output would fail to recognize the anticompetitive harm to the players.
Second, classical monopsony would not harm downstream purchasers if a single firm with
classical monopsony power sells in a perfectly competitive downstream market, and its
27

As a technical matter, the firm maximizes profits by hiring labor until the point where the value of the
workers’ marginal revenue product is equal to the marginal cost.
28

Chen Yeh, Claudia Macaluso, & Brad Hershbein, Monopsony in the U.S. Labor Market (January 12,
2022) (unpublished manuscript).
29

Azar, supra note 37. In fact, if workers have imperfect information and search costs, even small firms
have some monopsony power.

9

downstream competitors have constant marginal costs (and, therefore, perfectly elastic supply).
In that situation, its output reduction would be completely offset by the increases in output by
others. (By contrast, classical monopsony conduct by all the firms would lead to higher
downstream prices.)
Third, the potential for perfect substitution to other inputs also can lead to monopsony harms to
workers without harms to downstream purchasers. To illustrate, suppose that the cost of
delivering a meal purchased online on a college campus with a robot is $10 per delivery.
Suppose that students can also be hired to make the deliveries and students differ in the fees they
would be willing to accept as payment, and where a higher fee will attract more delivery
students. If the college acts competitively and offers students a fee of $10 per delivery, suppose
that there will be enough students to deliver 100 meals. If total meal demand is 200 meals, the
robots will make the other 100 deliveries. However, suppose that the college instead exercises
monopsony power by offering students a fee of (say) $7. If the number of students accepting this
fee are able to deliver (say) 80 meals, then the college will use robots for the other 120 meals and
end up with lower total delivery costs.30 Yet, there will be no impact on the marginal cost of
delivery, which will remain at the $10 cost of the robots. Thus, there would be no effect on the
college’s profit-maximizing price for delivered meals or output. Instead, the sole impact will be
harm to the student workers.
C.

Monopsony Bargaining Leverage That Can Benefit Downstream Consumers

Monopsony defined generally—that is, buyer-side market power—also is richer than classical
monopsony. It also can involve bargaining leverage in bilateral negotiations between a worker
and a buyer. In a market that involves bilateral negotiations between individual buyers and
sellers, a buyer-side merger or combination can increase the bargaining leverage of the buyers
and harm the sellers.31 For example, suppose that the top star figure skaters have unparalleled
ability as a result of talent and sunk investments. Suppose that two promoters compete to secure
the skaters’ services, allowing the skaters to obtain a high fee per performance. If the promoters
merge, each of the skater’s bargaining leverage will decline, now being unable to play off the
offers of the two promoters against each other. In economic terms, the merged promoter will
obtain a higher share of the gains from trade (i.e., technically, “bargaining surplus”) by paying a
lower fee per performance. In light of the lower fees, it may have the incentive to increase the
number of performances and charge lower ticket prices, thereby benefiting downstream
purchasers.

30

With these numbers, the total delivery cost will be $1760 (i.e., $7 x 80 + $10 x 120 = $1760), whereas
the previous cost had been $2000 (i.e., $10 x 200= $2000).
31

Similarly, a seller-side merger can harm buyers. Merger Guidelines, supra note 25 at § 6.2.
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Another example of this bargaining leverage analysis involves a merger or buyer-side
combination that countervails or disrupts a worker oligopoly or monopoly power and transforms
the market from sellers having classical market power to a “bilateral bargaining” situation that
can lead to the higher “efficient” level of employment, and a wage rate that divides the total
gains from trade according to the parties’ relative bargaining power. Thus, employment and
output increase and consumers benefit. 32 Bargaining leverage thus also may increase market
efficiency.
This logic can be applied to a hypothetical based loosely on the facts of California v Safeway33 in
a way that abstracts from any downstream collusion issues. Suppose that the workers are
members of a union that supplies workers to all the supermarket chains. If the union were to
engage in a strike against one chain, that chain would lose business to other chains, which also
would need to hire more unionized workers to pick up the slack. This would give the union
substantial bargaining leverage over each individual supermarket chain and allow it to negotiate
a high hourly wage rate. However, suppose that the supermarkets agree that if the union engages
in a strike against one chain, the others will compensate that chain, where each other
supermarket will contribute a fixed dollar amount per month. 34 This potential compensation will
increase the bargaining leverage of each supermarket chain facing a strike because it will suffer
lower costs from the strike. As a result, the union will settle for a lower wage rate. And because
supermarket workers are a variable cost, the lower wage can lead to lower supermarket prices
paid by consumers and more employment. This means that there can be a direct welfare conflict
between the workers and the downstream purchasers.35
*

*

*

32

The previously employed workers likely are harmed but the previously unemployed workers gain.

33

California v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011).

34

This assumption means that there will not be upward pricing pressure on the prices of the other chains,
contrary to what was alleged in Safeway. Opening Brief of Appellant, California v. Safeway, Inc., 651
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 08-55671, 08-55708) (“By requiring a Defendant that gained (or retained
greater) sales in comparison to another Defendant to pay the profit on those additional sales to the loser,
[the agreement] created strong disincentives to compete for those sales. By assigning a market share to
each Defendant and insuring that it kept only a share of the combined profits proportionate to its allotted
market share, the [agreement] created disincentives to increase output or lower prices in order to gain
market share.”).
35

This conflict may disappear in the longer run. In the longer run, fewer people may choose to undertake
the investment to become (say) skaters, leading in the first instance to fewer skaters, lower output and
higher prices paid by downstream purchasers. But there also could be offsetting investment incentives on
the other side of the market. Because they are earning higher profits, skating promoters may invest in
more flamboyant exhibitions, which could lead to increased demand by skating fans. Estimating and
balancing these conflicting effects would be difficult for economists as well as courts. See, e.g., Noll,
supra note 25.
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Whichever of these causes, there is evidence of buyer-side market power over workers and that
the combination of buyer-side and seller-side market power reduces workers’ real wages. For
example, a recent econometric article by Yen, Macaluso, & Hershbein that accounts for the fact
that both labor markets and product markets are imperfectly competitive finds that on average
workers obtain only 65% of their marginal productivity.36
To see how this figure is derived, a recent econometric study by Azar, Berry & Marinescu
(ABM) estimates labor supply elasticities that imply in turn that workers’ wage is equal to 83%
of the marginal revenue generated.37 However, these results do not take into account the effects
of seller-side market power, which further reduces the share of productivity captured by
workers.38 To see the reinforcing effect of seller-side market power, suppose that the only input
is labor and market power in the product market leads to a price-cost margin price of 25%, in
which case the share measured by ABM would equal to 70% of the price. Combining this
margin with the ABM estimate that buyer-side market power leads to a wage rate that is 83% of
the revenue generated by the worker at the margin implies that the real wage of the workers is
equal to only 62% (i.e., 75% x 83%) of the workers’ marginal productivity. 39 This is a
significant difference.
These three monopsony models form the background for the tension in antitrust law and policy
that is the focus of this article. If antitrust is assumed to be focused solely on welfare of
downstream purchasers, then only classical monopsony would be considered a cognizable
competitive concern. However, if competitive harms to workers also count, then antitrust
concerns also arise when there is classical monopsony that does not harm workers or increased
monopsony bargaining leverage. Antitrust law must decide how to deal with these conflicting
welfare effects. Should the principle that “antitrust is a consumer welfare prescription” imply
that the interests of downstream purchasers should take precedence? Or should the PNB merger
36

Yeh et al., supra note 28.

37

José Azar, Steven Berry & Ioana Marinescu, Estimating Labor Market Power (January 1, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript). See also Orley C. Ashenfelter, Henry Farber & Michael R Ransom, Labor
Market Monopsony, 28 J. LABOR ECON. 203 (2010).
38

Jan De Loecker et al., The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, 135 Q.J. ECON.
561, 571 (2020).
39

The technical details are as follows: Suppose there is monopsony power in the labor market that leads
to the wage rate being 17% below the firm’s marginal revenue product of labor. If the firm has market
power in the product market, the firm sets its marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, which implies that
marginal revenue is less than the product price by the difference between price and marginal cost, as a
percentage of price (Lerner margin). If this margin is 30%, then marginal revenue is equal to 70% of the
price. Thus, if the wage rate is equal to 83% of the marginal revenue product and marginal revenue is
equal to 70% of the price, then it follows that the nominal wage rate will be equal to 58% of the value of
the workers’ marginal product and the real wage (i.e., the nominal wage relative to price) will be equal to
58% of the workers’ marginal product. By contrast, if the product market were perfectly competitive, the
real wage would be equal to 83% of the marginal product.
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principle that beneficial “out-of-market” effects are not cognizable efficiencies apply? Or,
should the type of balancing suggested by the Court in American Express for a single two-sided
transaction platform market be extended to balancing of adverse effects on worker and beneficial
effects on downstream purchasers? Resolving these questions is the central issue facing antitrust
law in evaluating buyer-side restraints.
III.
Proposed Antitrust Approach: Recognizing Workers as Protected Trading Partners and
Prohibiting Out-of-Market Benefits from Justifying In-Market Anticompetitive Harms
Our proposed approach has two main prongs. First, the consumer welfare standard, properly
understood (and perhaps renamed for clarity), is broad enough to encompass harms to workers
(and other input suppliers) as cognizable antitrust harms, even if downstream purchasers are not
harmed.
Second, downstream purchaser welfare should not be privileged under the antitrust laws. As
succinctly stated by Herbert Hovenkamp, “restraints should be assessed in the particular market
that is restrained.”40 Nor should application of the consumer welfare standard compare and
balance the benefits to downstream purchasers against the harms to upstream trading partners or
vice versa. A better approach is to extend the longstanding approach of merger law and reject
claims that out-of-market benefits can justify harms from competitive restraints directed at
workers and other upstream trading partners. Restraints that reduce competition for workers and
worker income are antitrust harms, just as are similar harms to purchasers faced with seller-side
market power. Antitrust entitlements to competitive markets apply to both.
Third, welfare balancing across groups of trading partners is resource-intensive and errorprone.41 Because antitrust defendants typically have higher stakes than plaintiffs, the defendants
also will invest more in the litigation, skewing the errors towards false negatives and
underdeterrence.
Finally, balancing is often unnecessary to achieve the downstream benefits, because the firms
can compensate the upstream trading partners to voluntarily take the desired actions and achieve

40

Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition Policy for Labor Market, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN LAW at
4. https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2090.
41

In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 958 F.3d 1239, 1269 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d
sub nom NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (Smith, J., concurring) (“Realistically, the Rule of
Reason analysis is judicially administrable only if it is confined to the single market identified from the
outset.”)

13

the benefit to downstream purchasers. If welfare balancing is to be mandated, the task is better
left for Congress, not the courts.42
Our proposed approach applies to the conventional three-step rule of reason analysis. It also has
implications for the application of the ancillary restraints doctrine. The ancillary restraints
doctrine has a long history in antitrust, dating back to Justice Taft’s 1898 opinion in Addyston
Pipe43 which predated the formulation of the rule of reason in Standard Oil44 and Chicago
Board.45 While sometimes still referenced, the doctrine has been largely superseded today. 46
Under that doctrine, if otherwise per se illegal conduct is shown to be ancillary to a
procompetitive agreement or venture in which is embedded, the court will apply the rule of
reason to the conduct to evaluate whether consumers are harmed or benefited by the restraint. 47
In this sense, the ancillary restraints doctrine can be seen as a preliminary analysis, as a way to
distinguish “restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect
and those that call for more detailed treatment” under the rule of reason. 48 Alternatively, it
might be seen as part of the second step of the rule of reason, where the defendant must identify
a plausible efficiency rationale and provide sufficient evidence of competitive benefits to shift
the burden back to the plaintiff.49

42

Id. at 1269-70 (“[C]ourts employing a cross-market analysis must—implicitly or explicitly—make
value judgments by determining whether competition in the collateral market is more important than
competition in the defined market. As the Supreme Court has warned, this is not what the antitrust laws
invite the courts to do. ‘If a decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy
for greater competition in another portion this too is a decision that must be made by Congress and not
by…the courts…. [C]ourts are ill-equipped and ill-situated for such decisionmaking.’”) (quoting Topco,
405 U.S. at 611, 92 S. Ct. 1126).
43

United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d 175 U.S. 211 (1899)

44

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

45

Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).

46

As explained in a leading casebook, the doctrine “is best understood as a rhetorical device for
identifying plausible and cognizable efficiencies. It is no longer necessary as a legal basis for injecting
efficiency considerations and adds little to the rule of reason analysis of competitive effects.” Andrew I.
Gavil, William F. Kovacic, Jonathan B. Baker & Joshua D. Wright, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE:
CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY (4th Ed. 2022)
47

Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
48

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).

49

PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶1912 (4th ed. 2019). Yet a third way to understand the ancillary
restraints doctrine is that it operates to shift the scope of the conduct subject to analysis. If a defendant
shows that it is otherwise per se illegal conduct is ancillary to an agreement (including, joint ventures)
with a legitimate procompetitive purpose, then the court will proceed to apply the rule of reason to the
competitive effects of that agreement in the downstream market in which it operates. The impact of the
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Under our approach, an otherwise per se illegal restraint would be entitled to rule of reason
treatment (e.g., as an ancillary restraint) only where the procompetitive purpose of the larger
agreement or venture is directed at the market that is restrained. Similarly, in the context of the
conventional rule of reason, only competitive benefits accruing to the allegedly harmed trading
partners in the relevant market are considered cognizable. In other words, for restraints imposed
on trading partners (e.g., workers) in the upstream market, the relevant inquiry would remain
whether the restraint is ancillary to a legitimate procompetitive purpose benefiting those
upstream trading partners. Only the benefits accruing to the allegedly harmed trading partners
would be cognizable. Out-of-market benefits accruing to purchasers the downstream market
would not be considered cognizable. To put an even finer point on it, the ancillary restraints
doctrine is not an invitation to engage in balancing of out-of-market benefits against in-market
harms to justify harms in the relevant market.
A.

The Consumer Welfare Standard Does Not Privilege Downstream Purchasers

As discussed above, not all monopsony restraints that harm workers also harm downstream
purchasers. More pointedly, some restraints that harm workers may benefit downstream
purchasers. Where the welfare of upstream trading partners, including workers, and downstream
purchasers has come into conflict, policy to date has tended to favor downstream purchasers.
We disagree with this approach for several reasons.
One key rationale for this favoritism is a common misunderstanding that the “consumer welfare
standard” somehow means the antitrust laws protect only the downstream purchasers, whether
these direct purchasers are individuals or firms. The term “consumer welfare standard” was
introduced into the antitrust lexicon by Robert Bork’s provocative book 50 and then seemingly
blessed by the Court in its 1979 Sonotone decision, where the Court cited Bork in opining that
“antitrust is a consumer welfare prescription.” 51 This phrase has become a talisman for a narrow
focus on the welfare of downstream purchasers (whether corporations or humans), rather than the
welfare of trading partners generally. For example, in Weyerhauser, even while focusing solely
on the possible anticompetitive effects on the timber owners who were upstream sellers, the
Court opined that “predatory bidding presents less of a direct threat of consumer harm than
predatory pricing … [because] a predatory-bidding scheme could succeed with little or no effect
restraint embedded in the agreement would only be enjoined if there is a less restrictive alternative to it.
However, in our view, this interpretation of the ancillary restraints doctrine has properly been superseded
by the modern rule of reason that would find liability based on the impact of the restraint in the market in
which it is imposed, even if the basic agreement might be procompetitive. For example, the Court in
NCAA enjoined the joint broadcast licensing restraint even while allowing the other operations of the
NCAA venture to remain intact. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
50

Robert H. Bork, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).

51

Reiter v Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
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on consumer prices because a predatory bidder does not necessarily rely on raising prices in the
output market to recoup its losses.52
Invoking Sonotone’s declaration that the Sherman Act is a “consumer welfare prescription” as a
rationale for privileging downstream purchaser welfare is a misinterpretation of the Sonotone
case. The Sonotone defendants had moved to dismiss the damages claim on the ground that the
plaintiff had not been injured in her "business or property" within the meaning of § 4. The Court
of Appeals agreed that the phrase "business or property" was intended to limit standing to those
engaged in commercial ventures. The Supreme Court rejected this argument with the
aforementioned quote. The Court then went to quote its previous decision in Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc 429 U. S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) as follows:
We described the Sherman Act as "conceived of primarily as a
remedy for [t]he people of the United States as individuals,'
especially consumers," and the treble damages provision of the
Clayton Act as "conceived primarily as 'open[ing] the door of justice
to every man . . . and giv[ing] the injured party ample damages for
the wrong suffered.'”53
By dubbing the Sherman Act a “consumer welfare prescription,” the Sonotone Court was noting,
not its limited focus on downstream purchasers, but the broad scope of its protection of all
parties harmed by diminished competition. The Court refers to “the people of the United States
as individuals,” a phrase that surely includes workers. 54 And the additional comment “especially
consumers” in Brunswick is not surprising, as the court in that case sought to emphasize that the
law does not protect competitors from competition. Its invocation in Sonotone also is consistent,
since downstream purchasers were the potentially injured group there. Thus, using the term
“consumers” here should no more be taken as excluding or downplaying harm to workers than
the use of the term “every man” be taken to exclude or downplay harm to women.
Just as the Court’s adoption of Bork’s turn of phrase should not be overread, Bork’s “consumer
welfare” standard was, in substance, closer to a total welfare standard, and Bork was inconsistent
52

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 324 (2007) (citing Steven
C. Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 676 (2005)). This
talismanic effect led one of us to treat as evidence of downstream effects as required. By contrast,
showing downstream effects was not required by John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary
Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory
Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 625 (2005).
53

Id. at 343-344.

54

The legislative history of the Sherman Act expressed concerns with the welfare of workers and farmers.
For one recent review, see Sanjukta Paul, Recovering the Moral Economy Foundations of the Sherman
Act, 131 YALE L.J. 175, 203 (2021) and references cited therein.
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even on that point.55 In any event, courts have never embraced the content of Bork’s welfare
standard, which has never been adopted by the courts; the central focus in simple sell-side cases
has remained prices, wealth transfers and output, not efficiency and total welfare. Efficiency in
such cases only counts in that it contributes to the welfare of the purchasers.
The declaration that antitrust is a consumer welfare prescription also does not mean that
anticompetitive harms suffered by workers (or other input suppliers) are not cognizable. That
antitrust is called a consumer welfare prescription in no way excludes the idea that it also
protects other trading partners. The term “consumer” in this context is best understood as a term
of art, the scope of which should not be taken as coextensive with the colloquial usage. The
statutes make no mention of consumers, and precedent belies the notion that the courts have
limited the antitrust laws’ protections only to downstream consumers. For example, in
Mandeville Island Farms, the Court held that the Sherman Act protects upstream sellers to the
same extent that it protects downstream purchasers: “The statute does not confine its protection
to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the
outlawed acts because they are done by any of these.” 56 The Court did not require the victims of
this buyer-side cartel to demonstrate harm to downstream purchasers to sustain their claims. 57

55

Bork based his “self-named” consumer welfare standard on Williamson’s article. Bork, supra note 50 at
108-112. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18 (1968). But that article and diagram are focused on aggregate economic welfare,” which
is not consumer welfare. Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare
Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2010).
John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not
Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008). Aggregate welfare also includes the profits
of the defendant and its rivals, and workers and other input suppliers, not just the welfare of consumers
who purchase the product. In Williamson’s diagram, there is no apparent impact on workers or other
input suppliers. The profits of the merging firms are part of aggregate welfare; that is, the defendant’s
stockholders are treated as “consumers.” Williamson assumed merger to monopoly so there are no
harmed rivals. But if there were harmed rivals, their injury also would be included in the aggregate
welfare calculation and their stockholders also would be treated as “consumers.” Id. at 344 n.2. However,
Bork elsewhere treated the injury to rivals as irrelevant, showing that he was not even following this
welfare standard. Bork, supra note 50 at 63-65.
56

Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).

57

Although the Court analyzed the alleged effect of the restraint on the downstream market for refined
sugar, it did so on jurisdictional, not substantive antitrust grounds. Because sugar beets must be refined
nearby where they are grown, the market in which the refiners purchased sugar beets was limited to
Northern California, raising a question about whether the restraint affected interstate commerce, and thus
whether it could be governed by Congress. The Court ultimately held that the restraint permeated every
level of the market, including the downstream interstate market for refined sugar, and found jurisdiction
on that basis. As clearly as the Mandeville Court appears to reject balancing and any requirement for
downstream purchaser harm, it bears noting that the Court’s jurisdiction analysis concluded that the
restraint would necessarily diminish downstream competition between the refiners and reduce the
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A better characterization of the “consumer welfare standard” is that competitive restraints that
harm the trading partner participants in the relevant market—whether downstream purchasers,
workers, other input suppliers—violate the Sherman Act. In short, the “consumer welfare
standard” is a misnomer, as the standard as applied actually focuses on the welfare of any trading
partner in a relevant market. And as is the case across antitrust, anticompetitive conduct can
create anticompetitive effects and harm in multiple relevant markets. 58
Properly understood, the “consumer welfare standard” thus does not privilege the downstream
purchasers over other trading partners in the chain of production. Restraints on competition
among buyers directed at workers transfer workers’ wealth just as do seller-side restraints
directed at their customers. Antitrust is intended to protect participants from such restraints.
Antitrust, and the “consumer welfare standard” in particular, focuses on the potential harmful
effects suffered by the trading partner participants in a properly defined relevant market
restrained by the conduct. In this sense, these harmed trading partners in the relevant market are
the relevant “consumers.” The purchase of labor services or other inputs clearly can define a
relevant market, and workers are the harmed participants.59 Thus, the term “trading partner” or
“counterparty” welfare standard might be better terms.
For example, the Agencies have challenged some mergers on the grounds of buyer-side
competitive concerns that also raise concerns about harms to downstream purchasers and some
do not raise downstream concerns. 60 The DOJ’s recent complaint in the Penguin Random
House/ Simon & Schuster publishing merger alleges harm over authors but not harm to book
buyers.61 The Merger Guidelines also explain that in such cases, it is not necessary to show
harm to downstream purchasers. 62
B.

Out-of-Market Benefits to Downstream Purchasers Should Not Count

This discussion helps to explain the lingering confusion that persists over the term “consumer
welfare.” This confusion has led some courts, enforcers, and academics to undervalue
competitive harms to worker and other input suppliers when downstream purchasers are not
harmed by a restraint or when they are even benefited. Clearing up this confusion, and
recognizing that workers should be treated as protected trading partner participants under the
quantity of refined sugar being sold. Thus, the Court was not forced to confront a scenario where a buyer
side cartel arguably benefited downstream purchasers.
58

For example, sell-side price fixing by competitors in a product market may also harm their workers in
the buy-side labor market. Infra, section IV.E.1.
59

See, e.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2000).

60

Hemphill & Rose, supra note 20 at 2086 (n.24-30).

61

Complaint, United States v. Bertelsmann SE & Co. KGaA, No. 1:21-cv-02886 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021).

62

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 12 (2010).
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antitrust laws, leads to the further question of how the law should reconcile situations where a
restraint harms the trading partners in the relevant market (e.g., workers) but benefits trading
partners in another relevant market (e.g., downstream purchasers). Under an overly narrow (and
incorrect) view of “consumer welfare,” where only downstream purchaser impacts matter, there
is a simple (but incorrect) answer for a restraint that harms workers and benefits downstream
purchasers. But under the richer conception of consumer welfare to include other counterparties
in upstream markets that we endorse, a different answer is needed.
Our answer is that out-of-market benefits to downstream purchasers and any associated increases
in downstream competition flowing from an anticompetitive restraint that harms workers should
not be treated as a cognizable justification for that restraint under the rule of reason. This
approach has both normative and doctrinal rationales.
There are four normative rationales. First, allowing workers to suffer the adverse consequences
of anticompetitive conduct because it benefits downstream consumers is analogous to robbing
Peter to pay Paul. It would deprive workers of the benefits of competition to which they are
entitled in the name of enriching others. Perhaps this is just a principle of basic fairness. As
Justice Kavanaugh explained in Alston, “those [college sports] traditions alone cannot justify the
NCAA’s decision to build a massive money-raising enterprise on the backs of student athletes
who are not fairly compensated.” The trading-off of welfare between different groups is a task
for Congress, not the courts, as it involves choices that are inherently political. 63
Second, balancing of in-market worker harms and out-of-market benefits to downstream
purchasers also would be exceedingly resource intensive and prone to error. The harms and
benefits may not simply be financial but may involve various factors that are not directly
commensurable, such as price, quality, safety, and so on. 64 Even in the limited case of financial
harms and benefits, the appropriate comparisons and tradeoffs are not straightforward; the
economic positions of the worker asnd downstream purchasers may differ substantially, and
courts are not well-positioned to weigh their competing interests. This administrability problem
is a reason to avoid balancing.
Third, this complexity also will reward the party that invests the most resources in the litigation,
including possibly muddying the waters, making the merits somewhat harder to discern. And
63

United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972) (If a decision is to be made to sacrifice
competition in one portion of the economy for greater competition in another portion, this…is a decision
that must be made by Congress and not by private forces or by the courts.”); see also PNB at 371 (an
“ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits” is “[a] value choice of such magnitude” as
to be “beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and in any event has been made for us already,
by Congress.”).
64

For analysis of incommensurability, see Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in
Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2016).
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because of the typical asymmetric stakes of the parties, the outcomes will be distorted in the
direction of false negatives. Because the defendant will achieve or maintain the future profits
from exercising its market power through the restraints, it typically has larger stakes in winning
the litigation than do the plaintiffs. As a result, the defendant has the incentive to invest more in
the litigation, which tends to skew the likely outcome in its favor away from the merits-based
likelihood.65 This distortion in litigation outcomes reduces deterrence.
Fourth, an agreement to restrain competition for workers generally is not necessary to obtain the
benefits of the restraint. If the restraint would cause an increase in total net benefits, the
company itself should be able to re-distribute those benefits to compensate the workers while
profitably engaging in the restraint. This provides both a further reason for the law to reject outof-market benefits as a cognizable justification and provides reassurance that, in doing so,
antitrust law will not be depriving the economy of tremendous consumer benefits that could only
have been gained on the backs of restrained workers.
As explained in the law & economics literature, when an action harms one party while benefiting
another, an efficient way to resolve the tradeoff between harms and benefits is to assign liability
to minimize transaction costs.66 In this case, the party with the lowest transaction costs is the
firm imposing the restraint. Direct bargaining between downstream consumers and workers is
not viable, but the firm has established relationships with both and is in the best position to gauge
effects and strike a deal that improves the welfare of workers, purchasers, and itself, if welfare
can be increased by the restraint.
By holding the firms liable for their restraints that harm workers, and by precluding legal
arguments to justify those restraints by pointing to downstream consumer benefits, the firms
imposing the restraint will internalize the costs and benefits of the restraints and act accordingly.
Instead of forgoing a profitable restraint that leads to net benefits, the firm will distribute those
benefits among its trading partners (i.e., workers and downstream purchasers) so that none are
harmed. If the firm does not do so and the workers are harmed by the restraint, that fact suggests
the benefits from the restraint do not actually outweigh the harms.
For example, suppose that a firm would be able to reduce its prices and increase its sales and
profits if its worker turnover costs were reduced by a lower worker quit rate, since the lower quit
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Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Litigation with Inalienable Judgments (2022) (unpublished
manuscript). In class actions, skew arises from the fact that the attorneys investing in the litigation have
lower stakes than do the members of the class.
66

See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. R. 1089, 1097 (1972). Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 50-52 (9th ed. 1986).
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rate would allow it to save on training and other employee on-boarding costs. 67 Rather than
(secretly) adopting a no-poach agreement with its buyer-side competitors that coerces lower quit
rates, the firm could reduce its turnover costs by unilaterally increasing the wage rate it pays its
workers.68 Initial results from studies of the fast food industry after the wide-scale elimination of
no-poach restraints suggests the restaurants did just that. 69 To attract workers who are less likely
to quit, the firm can offer low entry-level wage rates that increase with the duration of
employment.70 In short, the workers would be willing to accept provisions that disincentivize
quitting in exchange for higher wages. And, if the legal framework prohibits multi-market
balancing, employers would have incentives rebalance the benefits of a restraint themselves,
rather than forgo a net-beneficial restraint altogether.
C.
Structuring the Rule of Reason To Avoid Balancing In-Market Harms and Out-ofMarket Benefits
As a doctrinal matter, our approach is an extension of the longstanding approach of merger law.
In Philadelphia National Bank (hereinafter PNB), the Court held that a merger that causes
competitive harms to purchasers in the relevant market is not justified by benefits to purchasers
in another relevant market.71 That remains good law today. As a result, claimed “out-of-market”
procompetitive effects from mergers are not considered “cognizable” efficiency benefits. Only
benefits accruing to consumers within the relevant market are counted by courts and enforcers
when assessing the competitive impacts of a proposed merger. 72 There is no economic or

67

See, e.g., Janet Yellen, Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment, 74 AM. ECON. REV. PROC. 200
(1984); Steven C. Salop, A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 117 (1979).
These lower costs give the firm the ability and incentive to pay higher wages because these costs can be
amortized over a longer period. A lower turnover rate similarly can incentivize the firm to offer more
training in that it will be assured of obtaining the productivity benefits of that training for a longer average
period, which also will give the firm the ability and incentive to pay higher wages.
68

If restraints are fully disclosed and new workers are well-informed, some market constraints will result.
But even with full information, such agreements will increase the bargaining leverage of the firms except
in the extreme case of a perfectly competitive labor market.
69

Brian Callaci, Sergio Pinto, Marshall Steinbaum, and Matt Walsh, The Effect of No-poaching
Restrictions on Worker Earnings in Franchised Industries, unpublished manuscript,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4155577.
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Joanne Salop and Steven Salop, Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market, 90 QUARTERLY J.
ECON. 619 (1976).
71

PNB at 370-71.
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In the Anthem/Cigna merger case, the Department of Justice claimed that the merger would raise the
price of health insurance. The parties claimed that cost savings from negotiating lower hospital and
provider fees would lead to lower insurance prices. The D.C. Circuit rejected this claim. United States v.
Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017). But then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent apparently would have
accepted this claim as a cognizable efficiency benefit, if the lower provider fees were the result of
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doctrinal reason why this approach should not also apply to other conduct analyzed under the
Sherman Act, particularly in the context of harms to workers and other upstream trading
partners.
While the question of whether out-of-market benefits are cognizable in non-merger cases has
never been clearly resolved by the Supreme Court, underpinnings of our answer find support in
the Court’s precedent. In addition to strongly affirming that the Sherman Act protects all trading
partner participants, not just consumers, the Court in Mandeville Island Farms also rejected
balancing of the harms to one party from a restraint against the benefits flowing to other parties
affected by the restraint.73 The balancing at issue in Mandeville Island Farms involved trading
participants in the same market, not participants in different markets in the same supply chain.
But the Court’s reasoning is broadly applicable. Just as the Sherman Act protects multiple
groups, antitrust harm to one party or group is not nullified by benefits flowing to another party
or group.
Two years after PNB, even Robert Bork opined in the context of non-merger cases under the rule
of reason that courts’ “decisions will, of course, necessarily affect the distribution of income both
as between groups of producers and as between particular producers and consumers, but the
courts are not permitted by the main tradition to take these effects into account in the decision of
cases.”74 In Topco, the Court cited PNB in opining that “[i]mplicit in such freedom [to compete]
is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because
certain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater
competition in a more important sector of the economy.”75 More recently, in Ohio v. American
Express, Justice Breyer’s dissent (joined by three other Justices) cited Topco, stating that “A
“Sherman Act § 1 defendant can rarely, if ever, show that a pro-competitive benefit in the market
for one product offsets an anticompetitive harm in the market for another.” 76

increased bargaining leverage (which would lead to benefits to downstream purchasers) rather than
classical monopsony (which would lead to harm to downstream purchasers).
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The Court has taken a similar approach in applying Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In the
Weyerhauser77 predatory overbuying case brought by injured rivals rather than by the timber
owners, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, rejected the suggestion that the plaintiffs, sawmill
owners that competed with the defendant, would have to show harm to downstream purchasers
from the restraint. Rather, the Court focused solely on the impact in the market for purchasing
timber and made the point that the impact on downstream lumber purchasers was not relevant to
its analysis.78
In the recent Alston case involving NCAA restraints on education-related payments to student
athletes, the Court declined to wade into whether the PNB approach should apply because the
parties did not specifically raise the issue.79 Rather, the Court simply took the lower courts
approach as a given. It also went out of its way to note that amici (including one of this Article’s
co-authors) had argued such balancing is improper, and that the Court was not deciding the
issue.80 The Court favorably cited Mandeville Island Farms when noting that the NCAA did not
argue that “to prevail, the plaintiff student-athletes must show that its restraints harm competition
in the seller-side (or consumer facing) market as well as in its buyer-side (or labor) market.” 81
It is also worth noting that in Alston, and in the other sports league cases that have come before
the Court, application of the rule or reason in lieu of the per se rule has been justified on the
grounds that competitive sports leagues cannot survive without some horizontal agreements
between competing teams.82 But this does not mean that all the league’s rules are permissible or
that all of them should be evaluated under a rule of reason that focuses on downstream effects.
In particular, harms to workers cannot be justified by benefits to competition or purchasers in
77
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downstream markets. Indeed, in Law v Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,83 cited largely favorably
by the Court in Alston, the Tenth Circuit evaluated another NCAA wage restraint, this one on
assistant coaches. The court applied the rule of reason, but nevertheless condemned the
arrangement under a quick look analysis, holding that the anticompetitive effect was apparent
and rejecting the NCAA’s allegedly procompetitive justifications. Among the rejected
justifications was the NCAA’s argument that lowering costs was necessary to provide
opportunities for less experienced coaches, to allow less wealthy schools to effectively compete,
and to maintain competitive balance. The court held that even if this had been established as a
factual matter, such cost reductions, even if passed on to consumers, cannot justify a buyer side
restraint because, if they could “then section 1 can never apply to input markets or buyer
cartels….,” and “[t]hat is not and cannot be the law.” 84
Finally, Justice Kavanaugh’s Alston concurrence appears to join the issue, explaining that the
benefits to consumers from the NCAA’s brand of amateur football cannot justify the
anticompetitive effects in the labor market.
[T]the NCAA and its member colleges maintain important traditions
that have become part of the fabric of America … But those
traditions alone cannot justify the NCAA’s decision to build a
massive money-raising enterprise on the backs of student athletes
who are not fairly compensated. Nowhere else in America can
businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a fair
market rate on the theory that their product is defined by not paying
their workers a fair market rate. And under ordinary principles of
antitrust law, it is not evident why college sports should be any
different. The NCAA is not above the law.
We take these cases as a navigable path to adoption of the PNB approach by the Court in a future
case where the parties squarely present the issue. We discuss the possibility that the Court will
do so in a post-Alston case.85
Despite this compelling case for applying PNB to conduct cases, courts have sometimes
appeared to weigh downstream purchase benefits against upstream harms. In the cases surveyed
below, the courts’ rule of reason analysis applied the ancillary restraints doctrine to buyer
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restraints in a way that focused solely on the effects of the restraint on downstream purchasers.
This approach is inconsistent with the line of decisions discussed above. It is also inconsistent
with the way courts apply the ancillary restraints doctrine to sell-side restraints.
In a typical sell-side case, sellers can escape per se liability by showing that their agreement is an
ancillary restraint. That is, they must demonstrate that the agreement is necessary to accomplish
a procompetitive goal that benefits competition and purchasers in the downstream market. If the
sellers make this showing, then the restraint is evaluated under the rule of reason. Importantly,
under the ancillary restraints doctrine as applied to conduct by sellers, no amount of benefit to
the sellers themselves or to their employees or upstream trading partners normally is sufficient to
escape per se liability; these are not cognizable benefits. An agreement between sellers will only
be considered an ancillary restraint if it is necessary for an arrangement that benefits competition
and the purchasers of the product, that is, the relevant consumers. Courts do not allow sellers to
justify or escape per se liability for cartels based on the benefits of the cartel to the cartelists.
Our approach is also consistent with the way in which the ancillary restraints doctrine originally
was developed in the context of non-competition agreements attached to the sale of a business. 86
To illustrate, to obtain a higher sale price for his popular bakery, the baker promises not to open
a new bakery nearby. In these cases, the restrained party and the benefited party are the same
person, the selling baker. This is very different from a scenario in which the restrained parties are
workers hired by McDonalds and the benefited parties are franchisees and consumers who
patronize McDonalds. In the cases analyzed here, there is no showing that the workers
benefited.
Board of Regents87 provides a good example of this distinction. The increased broadcast fees
accruing to the colleges from the joint negotiation and output restraints was not considered a
cognizable benefit. Nor were the benefits from selling more tickets and having a larger audience
for live games, which in any case arguably was a separate market. The only potentially
cognizable efficiency benefit from the joint action was the possible increase in competitive
balance. An increase in competitive balance allegedly would raise the quality of games, which
would have benefited both the TV networks that broadcast the games and their advertiser clients
(i.e., the direct and indirect purchasers in the restrained market). 88 Had this claim not been
rejected on the facts, it would have justified a rule of reason analysis to determine whether the
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restrained networks (and, by implication, their customers) likely were benefited or harmed by the
restraint.89
Similarly, consider intrabrand vertical restraints by manufacturers such as the minimum resale
pricing in Leegin.90 In analyzing this sell-side restraint, the retail purchasers may pay higher
nominal retail prices for the product, but the procompetitive efficiency claim is that the same
purchasers also gain the offsetting benefits of various non-price services. These offsetting
benefits lead to a lower effective “quality-adjusted” price, which leads in turn to higher total
demand and sales of the product. This is consistent with our approach of focusing solely on
benefits to trading partners in the same market in which harms are alleged.
Contrast this approach with the faulty approach taken in North Jackson Pharmacy,91 which
involved a buyer-side restraint, but where the court focused on effects on downstream
purchasers. North Jackson Pharmacy brought a class action suit against Caremark, a pharmacy
benefits manager (PBM), alleging that health insurers used the PBM to implement a cooperative
buying scheme that violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court determined that the rule of
reason should apply to the claims, despite finding that the agreement was horizontal. The court
reasoned that the alleged restraint was ancillary to an efficiency enhancing agreement whereby
the PBM performed a variety of services for the insurance companies. After concluding its
ancillary restraints analysis in this way, the court noted that “two other related factors” supported
its application of the rule of reason. First, “the antitrust laws ‘are designed to drive producers’
prices down rather than up.’ To hold an agreement that tends to lower consumer prices illegal per
se, without careful examination of the agreement’s true economic consequences, would seem at
odds with the Sherman Act’s purpose.”92 Second, “[a]ny premature ruling that one of the primary
functions performed by PBMs is per se illegal would have particularly far-reaching
consequences for the delivery of affordable prescription drugs to a large portion of the
population….”93 These factors, while not formally factoring into the ancillary restraints analysis,
suggest the court weighed the agreement’s potential to lower consumer prices against its harm to
sellers. This is a stark departure from the approach taken in sell-side cases.
Under our approach, restraints on labor market competition (and input market competition
generally) would, like sell-side cases, be evaluated by their effects on competition in the labor
89
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market and the workers who are treated as the trading partners in that market. Such an approach
reflects the fact that buyer-side restraints are the mirror image of sell-side restraints. It also
adheres to the underlying rationale for ancillary restraints in the first place; recognition that while
some agreements technically restrain competition in some way, they do so as part of a broader
arrangement that actually enhances competition in the market at issue. 94 Accordingly, to satisfy
the ancillary restraints test (and escape per se treatment or condemnation under the quick look
rule of reason) under our approach, a restraint on workers must be shown necessary to a
accomplish a procompetitive goal that benefits the restrained workers. Any downstream harms
or benefits to consumers from the restraint are non-cognizable and irrelevant to evaluating the
worker’s claims. This result applies regardless the relative magnitude of the alleged benefits.
Under PNB and Topco, no balancing of effects is normally permissible. 95
Finally, this approach would not permit buyers broad discretion to make agreements to
countervail the market power of the sellers, where that market power is achieved from superior
skill, a natural shortage of qualified workers, a union benefiting from an antitrust exemption, or
even permissible conscious parallelism in a worker oligopoly. For example, a few college
football players, have far more talent than others, which can endow them with market power.
Suppose that the restraint has the purpose and effect of countervailing this market power, leading
to lower payments to the players, lower downstream prices, increased output, and improved
welfare of the downstream purchasers. The other examples also involve legally achieved market
power, so the welfare of the downstream purchasers should not be privileged. Such “self-help”
is not permissible.96
D.

Cognizable Justifications: Restraints that Benefit Upstream Trading Partners

This analysis raises the question of what benefits would be considered cognizable justifications
under our approach, allowing the defendant to escape per se or quick look condemnation under
the rule of reason (including the ancillary restraints doctrine version). Where a restraint is
directed at upstream trading partners, these would have to be benefits that accrue to the
restrained upstream trading partners. For example, where the upstream trading partners are
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workers, a defendant would have to show the restraint benefits workers, not just downstream
customers. The following examples illustrate permissible and impermissible efficiency claims.
Suppose that the defendants defend a wage fixing agreement on the grounds that the lower labor
costs will incentivize them to reduce their downstream prices, which will benefit workers by
increasing employment when they increase output. They argue that competition among them for
workers requires an agreement to increase their bargaining leverage. This claimed justification
would fail. It is the equivalent of attempting to justify a seller-side price fixing agreement on the
grounds that it would benefit customers (and workers) by leading to more investment and higher
quality products simply because the companies would be earning a higher per unit profit margin.
Just as any seller-side cartel could make this claim, so could any buyer-side cartel make the
equivalent claim.97
But consider the following variation, which would be a cognizable justification. Suppose that
several firms involved in competing or non-competing industries contemplate working together
to create a new technology useful to each of them. Suppose that the R&D and later production
process will require highly skilled production workers and engineers, who will be trained as part
of the joint R&D process. The potential partners realize that subsequent competition between
them for the workers would lead to such high salaries that the whole enterprise will be
unprofitable. In this unusual scenario, if it is true that a no-hire agreement is essential to the
viability and creation of the venture, then it would be justified. Because total demand for labor
increases as a result of having a viable venture, the workers are benefited, relative to the venture
being abandoned.
The analysis of vertical wage restraints would be analogous. Suppose that a large automobile
manufacturer requires its dealers to pay lower wage rates, claiming that the lower labor costs will
incentivize the dealers to offer better working conditions or more worker training; which in turn
will improve the quality of repair services provided to customers; which in turn will lead to more
new car sales. The manufacturer also claims that this will increase employment at the dealers,
thereby ultimately benefiting the restrained workers. Suppose that the manufacturer further
argues that it cannot rely on the dealers’ own incentives because they are focused only on their
profits, not also the manufacturer’s profits. And suppose it argues that it cannot simply require
the dealers to increase training or improve working conditions because that approach would
involve it bearing prohibitively high monitoring costs. 98 This justification theoretically could be
valid. However, because the immediate harm to workers is direct and apparent, and the
justification is so easy simply to assert without proof, the manufacturer should be required to
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bear a heavy evidentiary burden to show that workers are benefited overall. This will be difficult
in light of the lower wage rates.99
In this case, a court might be tempted first to require the plaintiff to show that the manufacturer’s
dealers have market power in the labor market. However, this requirement does not make good
economic sense. The justification itself is premised on the ability of the restraint to lead to lower
wage rates.100 Nor would it make sense to require the plaintiff to show that the manufacturer has
market power in the automobile market. This is because the restraint is focused on the labor
market, not the downstream market.
Contrast an example where the auto manufacturer requires that the dealers provide certain
expensive training to the workers designed to improve the quality of repair service. Suppose that
the unilateral response of many dealers to this requirement is to reduce wage rates, or not to pay
workers during the training period. This restraint would not be condemned on a quick look.
E.

Lack of Market Power as a Rule of Reason Defense

In sell-side Section 1 rule of reason cases, defendants may argue that the agreement cannot cause
competitive harms because the parties lack market power. For example, if Wendy’s and Arby’s
were to propose a merger or a joint marketing program for a new sandwich they jointly
developed, they would argue that competition from McDonalds, Burger King and others would
prevent harms to restaurant patrons. This argument might well succeed.
Defendants in cases attacking no-poach agreements, joint wage setting, or other restraints on
workers and upstream suppliers might make similar arguments, claiming that they lack the power
to set or cause non-competitive wage rates. As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that
this argument would only be relevant if the defendants escape condemnation under the per se
rule or quick look, so that the restraint is analyzed under the full rule of reason. This escape
should only occur if the defendants can show plausible, cognizable efficiency benefits accruing
to the restrained workers. As discussed in the previous sections, these benefits often will not be
shown.
Even if the defendants overcome this hurdle, they will face others. First, the no-market power
argument only can apply if the workers had awareness and appreciation of the restraints,
conditions that may not apply to undisclosed no-poach agreements. For example, the franchise
no-poach provisions were part of the franchise agreement, not the employment agreement.
99
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Second, if workers lack the relevant information, or if they face search and mobility constraints,
even small employers may have market power. 101 Third, for entry level workers paid the legally
minimum wage, the no-poach provisions might be characterized as regulatory evasion. 102 Lack
of market power is not normally a cognizable defense for restraints that explicitly restrain worker
wage rates or movement among employers. However, it could apply to our hypothetical
example of the two firms engaged in procompetitive joint recruiting, training, and R&D.
F.

Accounting for Non-Monopsony Harms

A merger or other buyer combination can lead to worker or supplier harms that do not arise from
monopsony conduct. For example, suppose that a group of non-competing firms create a joint
venture (JV) to produce an essential component for their various production processes in an
automated factory at a much-reduced variable and total cost. Suppose that this JV factory uses
virtually no production workers, but simply two engineers, whereas the production processes
previously used by each of the firms employed many workers.
These worker harms would not automatically be considered anticompetitive. This effect is a
standard production efficiency benefit in that the combination achieves the same output at lower
cost with fewer workers. Assume further that this combination leads to a decline in the total
demand for labor in the local area where these firms and the JV factory are located, which causes
the competitive wage rates paid by other employers in the area to fall. In this scenario, workers
overall will be harmed, despite the increase in efficiency. However, our approach would not
condemn this JV. Although this adverse impact on workers arises from a buyer combination, the
impact does not involve classical monopsony or an increase in bargaining leverage, but rather a
reduction in the competitive wage rate flowing from the more efficient factory. Thus, we also
would not treat these worker harms as competitive injuries. 103 In this way, our approach is
consistent with workers being denied standing when mergers cause them to lose their jobs for
these reasons.104 The same analysis would apply to a merger that reduces or eliminates the need
for any other input through production efficiencies.
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G.

A Less-Preferred Alternative: Limited Multi-Market Balancing

In evaluating American Express’s anti-steering vertical restraint, the Court was willing to
balance benefits and harms among diverse parties. But it also explicitly limited this balancing
solely to two-sided simultaneous transaction platforms, where it defined a single relevant market
that included participants on both sides. In this way, it avoided any notion that multi-market
balancing should be permitted.105
Whether or not balancing is appropriate in the limited case of two-sided transaction platform
markets, such multi-market balancing is not appropriate for situations where a firm (or group of
firms) adopts restraints that create competitive harm for workers and benefit downstream
purchasers, for the reasons discussed above. That balancing also would be unnecessary since the
firms each could compensate workers and still obtain residual benefits for downstream
purchasers and itself, if the benefits exceed the harms.
We recognize that the Court may disagree with our proposed bar on balancing in-market harms
against out-of-market benefits. If the Court ultimately decides that such balancing is to be
permitted, we nonetheless propose that courts place a high burden of proof on the defendant to
show that the benefits of their restraint disproportionately exceed the harms. 106 The defendant
also should have the burden to show that it could not have avoided the harm by compensating the
workers directly. The defendant also should need to show that its restraints are no more
restrictive than necessary to achieve the benefits with substantially less harm to the workers.
These requirements are not unlike the approach outlined in the agencies’ 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, except our proposal is not rooted in prosecutorial discretion. The Guidelines
explain that while normally the agencies’ analysis of a merger will be restricted to the relevant
market where the harm is alleged, the agencies (as matter of prosecutorial discretion) will
consider out-of-market benefits only if those benefits are inextricably linked and would be
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substantial relative to harms, and only if those benefits would be lost if the harmful effect were
prohibited.107
Our approach places a substantial burden on the defendant. However, this burden is appropriate
to avoid false negatives in the face of the complex analysis and the need to provide incentives to
defendants to mitigate harms where possible. 108 This approach also is appropriate to avoid the
false negatives by compensating for the skewed outcomes that flow from the parties’ asymmetric
litigation stakes.
IV.

Antitrust Applications to Restraints Harming Workers

We next assess how this analysis can and should be applied to various antitrust restraints on
workers. These examples also illustrate the neglect and erroneous analysis of some these
concerns by antitrust enforcers and courts.
A.

Naked Buyer-Side Wage Restraints

Naked buyer-side cartels economically are the mirror image of naked seller-side cartels, and the
Supreme Court has unequivocally held that they deserve equally stark per se treatment. “A
horizontal conspiracy among buyers to stifle competition is as unlawful as one among sellers.” 109
Benefits to the cartelists are disregarded as non-cognizable. Seller cartels do not escape per se
treatment because they benefit the sellers or their workers or suppliers. Accordingly, our
approach would disregard benefits to buyers and downstream purchasers from buyer-sider cartels
as non-cognizable. Buyers should not be able to defend their buyer-side cartels on the basis that
they pass the cartel benefits on to downstream purchasers, regardless of whether those benefits
come from classical monopsony or increased monopsony bargaining leverage. This follows and
expands on the Supreme Court’s approach to date.
B.

No Poach Agreements
1.

Clearly Naked Horizontal Worker No-Poach Agreements

The DOJ’s 2010 so-called “Silicon Valley” case is an example of a clearly naked no-poach
agreement that should be condemned under per se liability.110 The conspiracy supposedly began
when Apple CEO Steve Jobs allegedly called Google CEO Eric Schmidt and they reached an
107
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explicit agreement not to “cold call” each other’s employees and they each placed each other’s
engineers on their internal “Do Not Call” lists.111 Apple and Adobe senior executives
subsequently reached a similar bilateral agreement, then Apple and Pixar, Google and Intel, and
Google and Intuit.112 Although it arguably may have been permissible for the firms to agree not
to solicit each other’s engineers involved in certain joint projects on which they were
collaborating, the agreements went much further. They included agreements not to solicit any of
each other’s engineers, regardless of whether or not they were involved in the joint projects and
regardless of job title.113
While this agreement was a naked non-competition agreement orchestrated at the highest levels
of the companies, the DOJ surprisingly did not bring the case as a criminal matter. 114 Nor did the
DOJ explain why it chose only to bring a civil case. Five years later the DOJ released guidance
that they would bring such cases as per se illegal criminal matters. 115 The first criminal charges
were subsequently brought against no-poach agreements in United States v. Surgical Care
Affiliates in 2021. Yet, as an illustration of the lack of attention previously given to per se illegal
restraints directed at workers, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it would
violate “fundamental principles of due process and fair notice” to allow a criminal prosecution
before it has been established in the civil context that no-poach agreements are per se illegal, and
that neither the Sherman Act nor the Government’s 2016 announcement were sufficient
notice.116
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2.

No-Poach Provisions with Downstream Price Benefits

Defendants might argue that the lower labor costs achieved via a no-poach agreement are passedon to downstream customers as lower prices, and that those price decreases render the
agreements non-naked and deserving of rule of reason treatment. This argument should fail. If
such an agreement were accepted in no-poach “market division” cases, then it also would
logically apply to an otherwise naked horizontal agreement to fix wage rates. However,
Mandeville Island Farms appears to rule out this argument, and as the Tenth Circuit said in Law,
“[t]hat is not and cannot be the law.”117
The DOJ agrees. Its 2016 HR Guidance states that “[f]rom an antitrust perspective, firms that
compete to hire or retain employees are competitors in the employment marketplace, regardless
of whether the firms make the same products or compete to provide the same services. It is
unlawful for competitors to expressly or implicitly agree not to compete with one another, even
if they are motivated by a desire to reduce costs.”
Defendants would have a better chance of success if their no-poach agreement were attached to
an otherwise efficient labor market agreement, so that the ancillary restraints doctrine might
arguably be properly applied.118 Under our approach, though, a restraint on workers should only
be deemed ancillary if the agreement plausibly benefits workers. Courts have not always made
this distinction. A recent decision by the Ninth Circuit in Aya v AMN illustrates how courts may
improperly downplay or ignore the competitive harms suffered by workers in the upstream labor
market, relative to possible competitive benefits accruing to purchasers in the downstream output
market.
AMN and Aya both supply traveling nurses to hospitals under contracts. AMN is the leading
firm. When AMN found that it had insufficient nurses to staff new contracts, it apparently did
not turn down the opportunity to bid nor did it hire new nurses on its own. It instead entered into
sub-contracts with competitors, including Aya. Aya agreed not to attempt to solicit any AMN
nurses during the duration of the sub-contract. AMN allegedly had similar sub-contract
agreements with other competitors.
Aya violated the non-solicitation agreement and AMN terminated their contract. Aya then
brought an antitrust case alleging that the non-solicitation agreement was a violation of both
117
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Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Aya identified both sales of staffing services to hospitals
and purchases of labor by the agencies as separate relevant markets where harms occurred. 119 In
the labor market, Aya’s allegations amounted to a claim that AMN orchestrated what might be
characterized as a buyer-cartel among buyers of nurses’ services with its multiple nonsolicitation agreements. The District Court rejected Aya’s per se claim and awarded summary
judgement to AMN under a rule of reason standard on the grounds that Aya did not show harm
to competition in the downstream market. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The court found the non-solicitation provision was a horizontal agreement, but that it was an
ancillary restraint and, therefore, should be evaluated under the rule of reason. Under our
approach, the court’s determination that the non-solicitation provision was an ancillary restraint
was flawed. Under our approach, a horizontal restraint on a labor market can only be considered
an ancillary restraint if it is subordinate to and reasonably necessary to achieve a collaboration
that has procompetitive effects in the labor market to which the restraint applied. Rather, the
court found the collaboration between Aya and AMN was procompetitive and, therefore,
legitimate, because it benefitted customers in the downstream market for hospital staffing
services.120
The court in Aya further erred in its application of the rule of reason by holding that it was
necessary to show harm to downstream purchasers -- that is, the hospitals -- not simply harm to
the nurses.121 While Aya had alleged both sales of nursing labor to hospitals and purchases of
labor by staffing agencies as separate markets for its Section 1 claims, the court rejected both
claims on the basis that it found no competitive effect in the downstream market in which
119
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hospitals buy nursing services. The court mentioned the labor market harms only in the context
of evaluating Aya’s claim of “retaliatory damages,” stating that Aya did not prove an express
buyer cartel.122 Anticompetitive effects in the labor market should have been sufficient to
sustain Aya’s Section 1 claim regarding nursing services under Mandeville Island Farms and its
progeny.
The AMN/Aya labor no-poach agreement might have been justified under our analysis if it were
intended to prevent AMN from hiring away the nurses that Aya supplied to the AMN contracted
hospitals under the subcontract, since these involved the cooperative relationship. In that case,
AMN might have argued that the protection of the no-hire agreement benefited Aya’s nurses by
allowing them to access jobs that otherwise would not have been available to them. But these
were not the facts. Aya was not trying to hire away AMN nurses that were working on subcontracted projects. Nor was Aya trying to hire nurses that AMN introduced to Aya. To the
contrary, and like the Silicon Valley case, Aya was trying to hire away AMN nurses who had no
relationship to these contracts but were nurses working for AMN on other unrelated contracts.
Aya was not free riding on AMN’s efforts to hire nurses. 123
The lack of connection between the no-poach agreement and the arguably pro-competitive
collaboration should have been sufficient to defeat Aya’s ancillary restraint argument. As an
economic matter, the restraint applied wholly outside the joint project. This is the standard
antitrust distinction between a restraint applied to the product of the cooperation and a restraint
applied to products outside the cooperation. 124
3.

Franchise No-Poach Agreements

This analysis raises the question of whether agreements between franchisors and their competing
franchisees should be treated differently. Some franchise agreements prohibit the franchisees
from soliciting or hiring employees that currently or previously worked at another franchised
store. These broad agreements even cover entry-level workers. There have been numerous such
122
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cases brought by State AGs and by private plaintiffs in class actions. If the franchisees had
agreed among themselves, the agreement would be considered horizontal, and the previous
analysis would apply. However, because the agreements are between the franchisor and the
franchisees, courts may treat the agreement as vertical and automatically apply the rule of reason
or perhaps apply an ancillary restraints analysis. 125
The Deslandes v. McDonald’s126 class action against McDonald’s and its franchisees concerned
a department manager at a McDonald’s franchisee, who was trying to become general manager,
which required additional training. When she was denied the training opportunity, Deslandes
applied to be hired by a different franchisee, but was unable to move because of the no-poach
restraint. The complaint alleged that the no-poach agreements among McDonald’s and its
franchisees were per se unlawful horizontal agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act or
illegal under the quick look.127 The court held that although the restraint had vertical elements,
the agreement was a horizontal restraint on trade because McDonald’s itself runs some
McDonald’s-brand restaurants (McOpCo Restaurants) and thus competes directly with the
franchisees for employees.128
In its 2018 order rejecting McDonald’s motion to dismiss, the court refused to deem the
agreement per se unlawful, as it was deemed “ancillary to the franchise agreements” which have
a “procompetitive effect” in the downstream market. 129 However, the court explained that this
did not automatically imply that evaluating the hiring restraint required the full rule of reason.
As the court explained, “the very fact that McDonald’s has managed to continue signing
franchise agreements even after it stopped including the provision in 2017 suggests that the nohire provision was not necessary to encourage franchisees to sign.” The court suggested that a
quick look analysis might be appropriate, explaining that “[e]ven a person with a rudimentary
understanding of economics would understand that if competitors agree not to hire each other’s
employees, wages for employees will stagnate. Plaintiff herself experienced the stagnation of her
wages.” Moreover, the court rightly focused on the competitive effects in the upstream market,
not interbrand effects in the downstream market, recognizing that "[t]his case, though, is not
about competition for the sale of hamburgers to consumers. It is about competition for
employees, and, in the market for employees.” This analysis tracks our approach to the ancillary
restraints doctrine set out above.
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However, the court then reversed its approach in its 2021 order denying class certification. In
making this determination, the court lost its focus on the labor market and focused instead on the
impact in the downstream market. Claiming to be applying the reasoning in Alston, the court
concluded that the rule of reason should apply because it lacked experience to conclude that on a
quick look, this restraint “so obviously threaten[s] to reduce output and raise prices.” 130 The
court relied on McDonald’s economic expert, who opined that “the hiring restraint increases
output in the hamburger market, because it encourages the very training that enhances the
brand…. That suggests the provision itself was output enhancing in the market for hamburgers
and fries.” The court apparently also accepted that the proper focus was on classical monopsony,
explaining that the expert concluded that “it does not make economic sense for McDonald’s, as
franchisor, to enable its franchisees to act as monopsony purchasers of labor.” 131
In our view, the court erred in its class certification analysis. Had the court focused exclusively
on the labor market, it could have condemned the restraint on the basis of the quick look. The
McDonald’s training argument apparently was mere assertion and did not show that workers
were benefited, only that downstream purchasers might be benefitted. Our approach also would
not have required proof that McDonalds and the franchisees were classical monopsonists. 132
Similarly, the Butler v. Jimmy John’s class action alleges that the franchise agreement was a
horizontal agreement that violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 133 Pursuant to the agreement,
franchisees are prohibited from hiring individuals who were employed at another franchise
location within the last year. 134 The agreement also stated that other franchisees, as third-party
beneficiaries of the agreement, had the right to enforce the no-hire agreement against other
franchisees.135 The court described the conduct as a “hub-and-spoke” agreement; but, unlike
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other hub-and-spoke agreements, “all of the firms in this case deal in the same brand.” 136 The
court cited Sylvania for the proposition that restricting trade within one brand cannot be per se
illegal.137 Butler argued that the level of independence between the franchisees was more than in
a typical franchise business. At the motion to dismiss stage, the court did not decide whether the
agreement was per se unlawful, but held that which standard would apply to the agreement
would depend on the independence of the franchisees. If the “evidence of franchise
independence is Herculean,” the court reasoned, then the agreement may be per se unlawful; but
if the franchisees were not very independent, then the case would be judged under the rule of
reason.138
If a court focuses solely on the downstream purchasers of fast food and their benefits, these
restraints could be characterized as an intrabrand vertical restraint subject to a full rule of reason
analysis. In Leegin, for example, the Court mandated rule of reason treatment for a vertical price
agreement between the manufacturer and its retailers. Leegin involved restraints placed on the
behavior of retailers with respect to their interaction with purchasers and the resulting effects on
those purchasers. But in Leegin, both the alleged harm and the alleged benefits from the restraint
applied to the downstream purchasers, and thus there was no out-of-market balancing. 139
These franchise no-poach cases are different because the harms are borne by the workers
employed by the franchisees and the benefits accrue to the purchasers of the franchisees’
products. To make the situations comparable, the restrained workers themselves would need to
be benefited by the restraints.140 For example, suppose that the no-poach restraints reduced the
likelihood that workers would quit, and this lower quit rate led franchisees to increase the
training provided to workers. As a result of the increased training, worker productivity would
increase, which would lead the franchisees to pay the workers higher wages. In this hypothetical
scenario, the workers would benefit and there would be no need for multi-market analysis. The
restraint instead could be justified on the basis of these worker benefits without a need to rely on
any additional benefits accruing to the customers of the franchise. In fact, it is not clear that the
136

Id. at 795-96.

137

Id. at 796 (quoting Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54–56 (1977)).

138

Id. at 797.

139

The Leegin analysis could apply to a franchisor rule that cheeseburgers be sold a price no greater than
$2.99 because the franchise advertises that $2.99 price. While purchasers are harmed by the higher price,
they benefit from being able to rely on the reputation of the franchise brand. Thus, both the benefits and
harms are focused on purchasers.
140

The complaint alleges that the no poach agreement reduces incentives to train workers. Class Action
Complaint at ¶ 88, Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955 (No. 17-c-4875). MacDonald’s claimed that the nopoach agreements were needed to incentivize training. Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17-c4875, 2018 WL 3105955 at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jun 25, 2018) ("Defendants argue that the no-hire restriction
promotes intrabrand competition for hamburgers by encouraging franchisees to train employees for
management positions").

39

franchisor would even need to force the franchisee to mandate these restraints on workers under
these facts; the franchisee and the workers would have the mutual incentive for adopt the
restraint141 As the Deslandes court explained, “Employers have plenty of other means to
encourage their employees to stay without resorting to unlawful market division. Those options
include paying higher wages/salaries and contracting directly with each employee to set an
employment term.”142
Such training benefits also are less credible for McDonald’s or Jimmy John’s if the training is
provided by the franchisor rather than the franchisee, or if the franchisee’s cost of the training is
very limited. In Deslandes, for example, the lead plaintiff obtained training that was provided by
McDonald’s corporate. For one type of training, she was required to attend McDonald’s
Hamburger University, which was paid for by the franchisor. The franchisees only had to pay
travel costs and certain other expenses, 143
Even if these expenses were significant, they still would not justify the no-poach agreement. A
less restrictive alternative would require the franchisee seeking to hire the worker to pay some
appropriate cost-based compensation to the franchisee that loses the worker. This alternative
makes more economic sense because the training then would be retained within the brand’s
franchise system when an employee wishes to change employers. By contrast, the no-poach
agreement leads to dissatisfied employees leaving the system, whereby the value of the training
is lost to the brand. This reasoning also suggests that the training justification is pretextual.
C.

Joint Purchasing Organizations

It is common for groups of firms to engage in joint purchasing of inputs. For example,
Northwest Wholesale Stationers involved a group of office supply retailers that joined together to
purchase wholesale office supplies.144 To take another example, hospitals may join together into
buying groups for the purchase of variety of medical instruments and other supplies. In these
buying groups, some members may be competitors while others are not.
Such collective action may allow the members to gain monopsony power over the suppliers or
workers (in the case of joint purchasing of labor) and reduce costs to downstream purchasers as a
result. Under our standard, these downstream benefits would not be a cognizable justification for
the restraint. But if the joint purchasing simultaneously creates real technological efficiencies
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that lead to lower input costs, our standard would condemn the agreement only if the workers are
harmed by the cooperative’s exercise of monopsony power (including increased monopsony
bargaining leverage).145 The source of the benefits to the downstream purchasers is not relevant;
the point is that they accrue in a different market, and thus cannot be used to offset the
competitive harm to the workers.
The Agencies’ 1996 Statement of Enforcement Policy on Joint Purchasing Arrangements Among
Health Care Providers146 illustrates enforcement policy that neglects the legitimate antitrust
interests of input suppliers. The sole focus of the statement is classical monopsony, not
increased monopsony bargaining leverage. 147 This Statement also creates an “antitrust safety
zone” if the JV participants account for less than 35% of total sales of providers and the
payments to the providers by the JV participants account for less than 20% of the revenue of JV
participants.148 If the JV is considered non-naked and falls within the safety zone, the claimed
efficiency benefits would not even be evaluated to determine if they improve upon what the
parties could achieve unilaterally, whether the joint fee setting is reasonably necessary, or
whether the upstream input suppliers are benefited from the creation of the JV.
By contrast, our standard would focus on worker welfare since the allegation is that there are
anticompetitive effects in the relevant market for the purchase of workers’ services. Thus, to
escape liability, it would be necessary for the purchasing group to show that any competitive
harms to workers are completely offset by benefits to the workers from the arrangement. This
might be the case if the efficiencies are sufficient to give the firms the incentive to raise the fees
paid to the workers or to make the buying group otherwise profitable without exerting bargaining
leverage on workers.
This does not mean that all joint labor purchasing that leads to lower wages would violate the
antitrust laws. As noted above, only agreements that create anticompetitive harms to workers
would be condemned, that is agreements that lower wages by the exercise of monopsony power.
Agreements that lead purely to production efficiencies would be permitted, even if they lead to a
reduction in employment or a reduction in the competitive wage rate not caused by monopsony.
By hiring or training workers jointly, costs may be reduced and workers may be assigned more
efficiently, both results which can benefit workers, as well as employers, and lead to more
employment as well as lower downstream prices. For example, a “nanny share” is a common
145

Supra, Section III.C.

146

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY
IN HEALTHCARE (1996), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1197731/download.
147

As the statement explains in a footnote: the agencies’ concern over the “exercise market power in the
purchase of the product or service” is limited to “the power to drive the price of goods or services
purchased below competitive levels.” Id. at 53 n.16.
148

Id.

41

arrangement where two families with young children jointly hire a nanny because neither can
afford a full-time nanny salary. Since most nannies want full-time work and are capable of
caring for more than one child at a time, jointly hiring a nanny through a nanny share reduces
families’ costs and increases employment for nannies. But if the efficiency leads to lower
demand for workers and the competitive wage rate falls, there also would be no liability.
This analysis also raises the question whether the same rules should apply to a standalone firm
that acts as a purchasing agent. For example, Kartell involved a dominant health insurer, Blue
Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBSM), that negotiated low rates and other terms with
Massachusetts health care providers. 149 Then-Judge Breyer characterized BCBSM as a single
entity whose rates were regulated by the state. He concluded that BCBCS was an agent
purchasing for its subscribers in the same way that a parent purchases for his or her children. 150
However, this characterization ignores the fact that BCBSM was the dominant insurer with
monopsony power. 151 BCBSM instead could be characterized as a monopsony agent for what
amounts to a “buyer cartel” of downstream healthcare purchasers. 152 In light of the other
services provided by a health insurer, BCBSM might not be a naked cartel. But that does not
mean that its exercise of monopsony on behalf of its subscribers should be excused. 153
D.

Buyer-Side Exclusionary Restraints

The previous analysis has focused on collusive restraints, that is, restraints that are designed to
achieve market power through cooperation among competitors. However, a dominant firm may
use its buyer-side market power to create exclusionary restraints that raise rivals’ costs and allow
it to maintain or enhance its market power. 154 These exclusionary restraints might involve
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agreements covered by Section 1 or monopolization (or attempted monopolization) under
Section 2. The analysis also may be more complex if the restraints benefit some workers while
harming others or benefit workers in the short run while harming them in the longer run.
The class action brought by mixed-martial arts fighters against the Ultimate Fighting
Championship (UFC) and its parent company, Zuffa, provides a possible example of this type of
restraint.155 The plaintiffs allege that the UFC engaged in exclusionary conduct that allowed it to
exercise monopsony power in the market for fighter services, allowing it to underpay its
fighters. The exclusionary conduct included long-term exclusive contracts with
fighters and acquisitions of rival promoters.
If the UFC were a monopolist facing a threat of downstream entry, the exclusivity could raise
entry barriers, and the exclusives could harm the fighters. 156 However, if the exclusives were
used to achieve monopoly power, then some workers might benefit in the short-run from
receiving payments for exclusivity.157 Those workers and others nonetheless would be harmed
in the longer run from the monopsony, once the rivals are marginalized or exit. In addition,
when the defendant gains monopoly power downstream and raises prices, which could further
reduce demand for the workers’ services. 158
This raises the legal question of whether it should be sufficient for the fighters to prove
recoupment in the form of lower salaries or other income, or whether they must also prove harm
to downstream purchasers. In Weyerhauser, the Court concluded that the sole focus of the
analysis should be the effects on timber owners. That is, it was not necessary to show harm to
downstream lumber purchasers. This is consistent with our approach, which would not require
the workers to show harm to downstream purchasers in order to recover. 159
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E.

Downstream Conduct that Harms Workers and Suppliers

An overlooked issue that our approach illuminates is harm to workers from their employers’
anticompetitive conduct as sellers in downstream markets. Workers can be harmed by seller-side
conduct that is collusive or exclusionary.
1.

Seller-side Collusion that Harms Workers

Consider the case of a seller-side cartel that fixes downstream prices and reduces output. The
workers may be harmed by the associated reduced demand for labor in the form of lower wages,
reduced work hours, or both. Like the plaintiff in McCready,160 the workers’ injury is
“inextricably intertwined” with the injury the cartelists seek to inflict on buyers. 161 Whether or
not the workers are the “target” of the conduct, their injury is an inevitable effect. Accordingly,
those workers should have standing to sue for antitrust damages.
Such damages actions would not be precluded by Illinois Brick. Illinois Brick precludes
damages claims that rely on pass-on to indirect purchasers, but these workers’ injury would not
involve pass-on. Their injury is a distinct harm in the upstream market inflicted directly by the
cartel and thus should not be precluded as “derivative” of harm to others. The distinct nature of
the harm is evidenced by the separate benefit that inures to the cartelists from the labor costs
saved from the reduced output. Accordingly, there is no concern with risk of duplicative
recovery, nor evidentiary demands of proving pass-on, nor issues with derivative injury, nor
disputes among groups of plaintiffs over a shared recovery. 162
Damages to workers from a seller-side cartel are somewhat analogous to umbrella damages,
which many courts have found recoverable 163 and which Areeda and Hovenkamp and other
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academics have endorsed.164 Umbrella damages in a seller-side case result when competitors not
participating in the cartel nonetheless are able to raise their prices because the presence of the
cartel shields them from losing customers. Illinois Brick does not preclude umbrella damages,
because there is no claim of pass-on and the damages are distinct from those arising from the
cartelist’s sales. Worker harm from a seller-side cartel is similar, as it represents a distinct injury
inflicted without pass-on. Indeed, the case for worker recovery in this scenario is stronger.
Unlike those who buy from those firms outside of the cartel, workers are in privity with the
cartelists, and the cartelists inflict the harm and receive the benefits from that harm in the form of
cost savings.
Yet, workers rarely bring claims alleging harm from their employer’s output-reducing
anticompetitive conduct. And, they often are denied standing when they do. 165 But in some
cases, courts have found employees of sell-side conspirators do have standing. 166 And, some
courts have noted doubts about whether “judicial glosses” that restrict the broad language of the
Clayton Act to deny standing to injured workers injured by their employer’s anticompetitive
downstream conduct are valid.167 Courts also are split on whether employees fired for their
refusal to participate in their employer’s anticompetitive conduct have standing, though this is a
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somewhat different issue.168 Under our approach, workers in each of these cases would have
standing.
While Associated General Contractors (AGC) may appear to take a contrary position, the
unusual facts of that case distinguish it.169 The union plaintiff in AGC was part of a collective
bargaining agreement with the defendant association of contractors. The union alleged that the
association coerced its members and their customers to direct some of their business to nonunion firms. The Court found such coercion violates the antitrust laws, because “it prevents its
victims from making free choices between market alternatives” and therefore “is inherently
destructive of competitive conditions…,”170 and that the union had alleged “a causal connection
between an antitrust violation and harm to the union and further…that the defendants intended to
cause that harm.”171 However, the Court denied the union antitrust standing because the union’s
“primary goal is to enhance the earnings and improve the working conditions of its membership”
and “that goal is not necessarily served…by uninhibited competition among employers striving
to reduce costs in order to obtain a competitive advantage over their rivals.” 172 Put differently,
the Court was concerned that the union was trying to use the antitrust laws to protect its own
(legal, but anticompetitive) cartel, not to promote the public interest in competition.
The Court also found the union’s harms were the result of harms to unionized businesses and
workers. Thus, the union’s claims were derivative and raised pass-on concerns that would not be
present in a case where workers are directly harmed by their employer’s anticompetitive output
reduction.173 Indeed, the Court expressly noted that had the union contractors that lost business,
rather than the union itself, brought the claims, their claims would have been more direct. 174
This is not to say that workers would have injury or standing in every seller-side cartel. For
example, where a seller-side cartel increases prices without reducing output, as it might in a
168
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market where demand is perfectly inelastic, unionized workers conceivably may benefit in the
form of higher wages.175 And, if so, they may even facilitate such a cartel. 176 In these situations,
their benefits should not be regarded as offsetting the harm to buyers or balanced against those
harms in assessing the legality of the cartel.
2.

Seller-Side Exclusionary Conduct that Harms Workers

Just as collusive conduct by sellers in the downstream market can harm their workers, so can
seller-side exclusionary conduct. For example, suppose that a dominant seller locks up a large
portion of its customers into long-term exclusive contracts, causing its sell-side competitors to
exit and it to achieve or enhance monopoly power. As a result, suppose that the firm reduces
output and raises prices, which reduces its demand for labor. 177 Moreover, if the company also
gains classical monopsony power or monopsony bargaining leverage, its workers also could
further suffer reduced wages and hours. Either way, the workers should have standing to recover
for this injury.178
In the famous Pennington case, the leading coal producers with capital-intensive mining
technology orchestrated a higher industry-wide union wage rate that raised their costs, but raised
the costs of the smaller labor-intensive firms by more, so that the competitive price of coal could
have increased by more than the costs of the leading firms, as explained in Williamson’s classic
article.179 This conduct thus would give these larger firms “collective” market power. At the
same time, it could harm the workers, despite the increase in union wage rates. First, a shift in a
fixed level of production from the labor-intensive firms to the capital-intensive firm would
reduce employment. Second, a reduction in production from the anticompetitively higher coal
prices would further reduce employment, including employment by the capital-intensive
producers. In our approach, the workers harmed by the cartelists’ reduced demand for
175
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employment from the higher coal prices could have standing to allege these anticompetitive
effects in the labor market.180
F.

Agreements Among Workers

Workers have incentives to engage in joint action that can lead to higher wage rates. These
range from naked cartels to efficient joint ventures.
1.

Naked Worker Cartels

It has been suggested that non-unionized contract workers should be permitted to collectively
negotiate to countervail employer monopsony.181 If the sole purpose of this coordination is to
negotiate higher wages, the clear antitrust answer is that this is not permissible. The per se rule
against seller-side cartels is unchanged when the cartelists are workers who are sellers of labor.
Congress has used labor and antitrust law to immunize certain types of horizontal agreements
and cooperation among workers from antitrust scrutiny. 182 But outside of the bounds of those
exceptions, worker cartels normally are treated like any other seller-side cartel. For example, in
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association,183 the Court condemned as per se illegal a one-day
strike and associated threats by the lawyers for higher pay. In several complaints, the FTC has
condemned certain trade association bylaws of music teachers, 184 interpreters185 and ice skating
coaches186 that prohibited poaching the clients of other members. This is consistent with our
approach of embracing the idea that workers should have equal, but not exceptional, status under
the antitrust laws. However, in a case that likely will be appealed to the Supreme Court, the First
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Circuit recently upended this view, ruling that the alleged cartel conduct of horse racing jockeys
was exempted under labor law.187
2.

Non-Naked Worker Associations

This raises a further question of whether a worker association—what Sanjukta Paul has called a
“for profit hiring hall”188 —might escape the per se rule and prevail under the rule of reason by
creating a joint venture with the type of efficient integration that passed muster in BMI.189 For
example, consider an association of drivers who provide services to ride-hailing firms like Uber
and Lyft, and delivery services like Door Dash and Amazon. Assuming that they cannot become
classified as employees, such an association might create efficiency-enhancing integration by
providing services such as recruiting, screening drivers for criminal and driving records,
administering personality tests and other metrics to find drivers that would provide good service,
periodically inspecting vehicles for safety and quality, and having “secret shoppers” check on the
quality of service provided. Because of the inspections and screening, the association could be
an efficient insurer, and so could provide low-cost liability insurance to association drivers and
the customer firms. If the association has a large number of members, it also could ensure a
sufficient number of drivers to meet clients’ peak demands. By working with multiple types of
clients (e.g., ride-hailing companies, store and restaurant deliveries, courier services, etc.), the
association could enjoy economies of scope to match the client’s needs, both with respect to
demand volatility and driver types. For example, a chauffeuring firm might need a driver with a
concealed-carry license for one of its clients. By providing all these services, the association
might be able to reduce the costs of the client firms and increase the quality of driver services
provided.
The association may argue that these are not benefits that the individual drivers could provide as
efficiently on their own. For example, the association might provide a coordination function in
assigning the number and type of drivers needed by the client firm. The association might also
provide certifications that a driver cannot credibly provide itself. The association also could
lower the drivers’ costs in other ways, for example, with fleet cards to purchase gas. Thus, there
is a plausible argument that the association could be seen as an efficiency-enhancing joint
venture.
The client firms in principle could provide many of these services themselves, but may be less
efficient for several reasons. First, the association may benefit from its economies of scope by
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contracting with multiple clients, particularly with respect to assigning drivers. Second, as
owners of the association, the drivers could have the incentive to monitor the performance each
other, which would reduce monitoring costs and increase efficiency. Third, the ownership stakes
in this type of cooperative also may also increase worker satisfaction, which lead to higher
quality service.
The association likely would want to prohibit members from contracting directly with clients.
Members of ASCAP and BMI music collectives were permitted to engage in direct dealing with
licensees outside of the association, which was a key fact for the Court. 190 However, nonexclusivity may create a free rider problem for the driver association that was not present in BMI,
which the association may argue justifies exclusivity. Once the association screens and certifies
drivers, client and non-client firms might free ride by hiring them independently in reliance on
the screening and certification.191
If the association would want to set the payment terms, rather than each driver setting its own
fees, this would be the knottiest issue.192 In BMI, the blanket license was permitted because it
was a not a product that the individual composers could provide individually. By contrast, the
Court said that the NCAA colleges (or the individual conferences) should negotiate with the
broadcast networks individually rather than NCAA setting prices. In light of the ancillary
restraints discussion above, the association would have to show that its setting of payment
terms—a restraint that operates in the market for the sale of labor to client firms—is reasonably
necessary to achieve benefits for the client firms and that it is no more restrictive than necessary.
The association thus would have to argue that in addition to providing drivers, it also is
substantially reducing the transaction costs of the client firms and engaging in joint production
through its coordination functions, and that joint fee setting is necessary to achieve these
benefits. It is not clear that these arguments would succeed.
The driver association might argue that other worker associations routinely are permitted to set
prices jointly. For example, law firm partners are comprised of potential competitors who could,
in principle, set rates independently, as are doctors in joint medical practices. The association
might argue that it has the same type of joint production, coordination and integration
efficiencies. If it can make this showing, it is not clear why an association of blue collar drivers
should be treated differently by the antitrust laws than other joint ventures.
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The antitrust agencies might suggest that employees of standalone firms should be treated
differently from firms that are joint ventures of competitors. If the courts were to find this
distinction relevant to the association’s liability, however, the association might set itself up as a
standalone firm in which the workers are not owners but would obtain equivalent benefits. For
example, the association could replace worker ownership shares with year-end bonuses that lead
to the same economic effects and incentives, or even “shadow stock.”
While providing plausible justifications, these arguments are not certain to succeed, and any
efficiency claims would require careful scrutiny. The courts further may not be convinced that
these efficiencies justify joint pricing, even if they do create integrative efficiencies. However,
that uncertainty does raise the key question: if this type of association raises substantial antitrust
risks, then why has antitrust been permissive with respect to law firm partnerships and medical
practices?193 Similarly, why should standalone firms that hire workers to provide labor service
to clients—such as labor staffing firms—be permitted to set fees, rather than having the workers
do so?194 It may be that law firms and labor staffing firms differ significantly in the efficiencies
they offer or in other competitively significant ways, and we have not attempted to conduct that
analysis here. But, absent some principled distinction in the law, these organizations should be
treated comparably.
Finally, we note that even if the association would pass muster under prevailing antitrust
jurisprudence, practical impediments could prevent its success. These include substantial sunk
costs to develop the testing and monitoring protocols and services, promotion, possible antitrust
litigation costs, as well as risk of failure. The driver-owners are unlikely to have the savings to
finance the start-up and bear the risk. If the association brings in a venture capitalist, that could
lead to potential conflicts of interest if the capitalist has substantial control. 195
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V.

Potential Post-Alston NCAA Litigation

Our recommended approach to joint purchasing applies directly to the likely future case in which
the Department of Justice or a class action (such as House v NCAA196) that attacks the NCAA’s
ban on non-education-related payments to student-athletes. The district court in Alston evaded
this issue with its “split the baby” decision on education expenses and the Supreme Court went
along. But this approach may not work twice: a case squarely alleging that restrictions on noneducation-related payments to student athletes constitutes a clear anticompetitive horizontal
agreement.197
In his Alston concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh emphasized three key points. To paraphrase them,
first, Alston “does not address the legality of the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules.”
Second, the analysis of the remaining compensation rules “should receive ordinary rule of reason
scrutiny under the antitrust laws” that ignores “the decades-old ‘stray comments’ about college
sports and amateurism, which have no bearing on whether the NCAA’s current compensation
rules are lawful.” And third, in his view, “there are serious questions whether the remaining
compensation rules can pass muster under ordinary rule of reason scrutiny” because the NCAA
may lack a “legally valid procompetitive justification.”198
Our analysis indicates that the NCAA’s prohibition on such payments that are not educationrelated cannot pass muster under the rule of reason. Those restraints cannot be saved by
attempting to apply an ancillary restraints doctrine that focuses on the benefits to the downstream
purchasers of college sports. The alleged competitive benefit in Alston was the consumer appeal
of college sports as distinct from professional sports. It is not clear that the appeal of college
sports flows from non-payment of players rather than simply the use of less seasoned athletes
and traditions. In any event, these benefits to fans would not represent a legally valid
procompetitive justification under our approach because they are outside the relevant market. As
we have discussed, deeming this downstream justification cognizable would be a misuse of the
ancillary restraints doctrine. The doctrine is properly limited to restraints that increase welfare in
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the same market in which the restraints are applied. As Justice Kavanaugh pointedly explained,
“a monopsony cannot launder its price-fixing of labor by calling it product definition.” 199
Even taking as given the claim that that there is distinct demand for college football played by
underpaid student-athletes, the NCAA’s mandatory rule would be condemned because the rule is
not necessary to achieve the claimed benefit. If there is such demand, each college can make its
own independent decision of whether and how to compensate student-athletes.
Even taking as given the claim that that there is distinct demand for college football played by
underpaid student-athletes, the NCAA’s mandatory rule would be condemned because it is not
necessary to achieve the claimed benefit. Justice Kavanaugh’s reductio ad absurdum analogy to
(say) a group of law firms that agree to “cabin associates’ salaries in the name of providing legal
services out of a ‘love of the law’” 200 illustrates the point. Presumably, some clients would
prefer law firms comprised of such lawyers, so there could be distinct demand. But while a
single law firm might unilaterally adopt this approach, a group of law firms could not agree to set
a salary cap. Such a restraint should and would be condemned under the quick look or per se
rule.
In fact, there is a precedent for this approach to NCAA restrictions. As discussed earlier, the
Tenth Circuit in Law applied a quick look analysis that found clear anticompetitive effects on the
coaches’ salaries.201 It rejected the argument that there were within-market benefits to coaches
by retaining an additional entry-level coach. 202 It also rejected the argument that the restraint
would be procompetitive because it would reduce costs, 203 and various flavors of a claim that
the restrictions would benefit downstream competition by improving competitive balance
among the teams.204
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VI.

Conclusions

Our analysis suggests that antitrust law should adopt the following four propositions: (i) antitrust
analysis should focus on the welfare of the trading partner participants in the relevant market
alleged to be harmed by a competitive restraint and should not privilege the welfare of
downstream purchasers; (ii) courts applying Sections 1 and 2 should adopt the Philadelphia
National Bank doctrine that rejects out-of-market benefits as cognizable justifications for
restraints that harm the trading partner participants in the relevant market; (iii) the ancillary
restraints doctrine should only allow departures from the per se rule escape from quick look
condemnation for restraints that are ancillary to a legitimate collaboration and have
procompetitive benefits to the participants in the relevant market alleged to be harmed by the
restraint; and (iv) if the only justifications for a restraint involve benefits to participants in
another relevant market, the otherwise anticompetitive restraints should be condemned under the
quick look or per se rule.
The first proposition is fundamental and well-established in antitrust law. The others are less
clearly established. But our analysis indicates that they are consistent with basic antitrust
principles and represent sound antitrust policy. Thus, we hope that the courts adopt these
propositions. While we are focusing on restraints that harm workers in this article, our analysis
can be applied to the rule of reason (and the ancillary restraints doctrine) involving allegations of
harm to other input suppliers.
We recognize that this approach might be seen by some as a significant change and might lead
the Court to soften these propositions by allowing balancing of effects in some limited
circumstances. If such balancing is to be permitted, we recommend that courts place a
substantial burden of proof on the defendant clearly to show beneficial “net effects.” The
defendant also must carry the burden of explaining why it was not possible to avoid the harms
with a voluntary agreement. If the defendant carries both of these burdens, the plaintiff would be
permitted to apply a less restrictive alternative analysis, showing that the benefits to the
downstream purchasers could be obtained with substantially less harm to the workers.
This raises the question of whether this approach has any likelihood of being embraced by the
Court, perhaps in a subsequent case involving non-education-related payments to college
athletes. We can only speculate. However, the dissenting Justices in American Express
embraced the statement that defendants can rarely, if ever, show that a pro-competitive benefit in
the market for one product offsets an anticompetitive harm in the market for another.” 205 In
addition, Justice Kavanaugh’s Alston concurrence appears open to this approach, at least with
205

Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2302 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Less clear is the
significance of Justice Barrett’s question to counsel for the United States, as amicus curiae, at the Alston
oral argument about whether the cross-market balancing framework deployed by the lower courts in the
case was “performing any kind of distorting effect that would influence the way we think about this case
in a bad way?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 85, Alston, 141 S.Ct. 2141 (2021).
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respect to college athletes. While this does not constitute a majority, it does suggest a possible
path to adopting our approach.
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